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Abstract
Scientific determinations are often at the heart of environmental disputes. When those
disputes take the form of litigation, the courts may be called on to determine whether an
administrative agency’s treatment of the science warrants deference. For several reasons, judges
are inclined to apply deferential review to agency factual and policy science-based determinations.
Most judges are not trained in the language and methods of science. They may be reluctant to
intervene on matters on which their lack of expertise risks producing uninformed judgments. If a
statute delegates to an agency the responsibility of making those determinations, courts may be
loath to usurp that authority by substituting their judgment for the agency’s. If the statutory
delegations authorize agencies to premise their decisions on the best available information, courts
may regard that authorization as a signal not to take agencies to task for failing to do the
impossible. Those mandates reflect a congressional judgment that agency determinations should
pass judicial muster even if they fall short of conclusiveness, which may be impossible to achieve.
Finally, when technical issues arise in the context of uncertainty at “the frontiers of scientific
knowledge,” the Supreme Court has warned judges that highly deferential review is required.
This Article describes a study analyzing cases decided by the federal courts over a period
of thirty years which presented issues involving scientific uncertainty tied to climate change that
arose under two key environmental statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Article provides both quantitative and qualitative analysis
of those cases, focusing on ascertaining the factors that drove courts to apply either deferential or
non-deferential review. We found, as might be expected, that the courts applied deferential review
in the majority of climate change cases arising under these two laws presenting disputes in which
litigants challenged agency resolution of factual or policy matters characterized by scientific
uncertainty. In the remaining cases, however, the courts, applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard of judicial review, refused to defer, engaging instead in relatively rigorous review of
agency science. They did so for any one of several reasons, including irrationality in agency
reasoning, incomplete analysis of record science, evidentiary shortcomings, and end resultoriented reasoning. These practices induced courts to reject rote acceptance of agency pleas for
deference to their scientific expertise. The Article concludes by suggesting further studies that may
be useful in understanding how courts can be expected to strike the balance between deferential
review and insistence that agencies provide adequate reasons for their actions in contexts of
scientific uncertainty.
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I. Introduction
Science plays a critical role in identifying how to address important social problems, as the
Covid-19 epidemic vividly demonstrated. 1 The development of governmental policies to solve
social problems often relies on law as a “problem-solving tool.” 2 The forums in which that process
of problem solving occurs include litigation, for “when existing law [in the form of statutes, for
example] is clearly not adequate to resolve the dispute, the court confronts an opportunity to solve
the underlying social problem self-consciously, on its own authority, by making law.” 3
But the disciplines of science and law don’t necessarily see eye to eye on matters such as
what scientific knowledge is or the proper use of the information it provides. One salient example
of the different lenses used by scientists and lawyers concerns scientific uncertainty. 4 As one
Dale Jamieson, Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process, 545 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLITICAL
36 (1996) (“Some of the most controversial public policy decisions in American society involve
risks that are primarily understood through scientific processes and institutions.”).
2
J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory
to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 405, 475 (1997).
3
James A. Henderson, Jr., Contract’s Constitutive Core: Solving Problems by Making Deals, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
89, 116 (2012).
4
See Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 289 (2013) (noting that
terms that are superficially identical in law and science (such as ‘fact,’ ‘uncertainty,’ and ‘proof’) . . . have deeply
1

AND SOC. SCI. 35,
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sociologist has noted, “[b]ecause science involves producing knowledge about what was
previously unknown, uncertainty is a normal and necessary characteristic of scientific work.” 5
When scientific issues arise in litigation, however, judges may expect “that science and scientists
will simply present objective truth. On this expectation, judges find it hard to understand that
established scientists can hold opposing views on quite basic questions.” 6
Judge James Skelly Wright, in an early Clean Air Act case, explored the differing
perceptions of fact and uncertainty in the contexts of scientific research and civil litigation. He
explained that a scientist typically will not regard evidence as establishing certainty:
unless the probability of error, by standard statistical measurement, is less than 5%. That is,
scientific fact is at least 95% certain. Such certainty has never characterized the judicial or the
administrative process. . . . The standard of ordinary civil litigation, a preponderance of the
evidence, demands only 51% certainty. A jury may weigh conflicting evidence and certify as
adjudicative (although not scientific) fact that which it believes is more likely than not. 7
Stephanie Tai has elaborated further on “the divergence in judicial and scientific uses of the term”
scientific uncertainty: 8
Scientists, especially in the area of risk assessment, focus more on uncertainties in scientific
research—or “knowledge uncertainty,” as some commentators have described it—and less
on the presence of controversies between scientists or sets of scientists. Courts, however,
also often use the term “uncertainty” to include areas where significant disagreement exists
on particular scientific findings—or “controversy uncertainty” . . . .” 9
Thus, according to one observer, “scientific uncertainty mediates between the closed world of
scientific knowledge and the open world of public policy formulation.” 10 It is “constructed by both
different meanings in their respective disciplines. Lawyers and scientists may be using the same words without
realizing that they are talking past each other.”).
5
Stephen C. Zehr, Scientists’ Representations of Uncertainty, in COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY: MEDIA
COVERAGE OF NEW AND CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE 3 (Sharon M. Friedman, Sharon Dunwoody & Carol L. Rogers
eds., 1999),
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=W8Ute8VA2pUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=significance+scientific+
uncertainty+climate+change&ots=rPSGHW20F9&sig=uSKINm0i4ZaoWB9sjVMaXA1ilk#v=onepage&q=significance%20scientific%20uncertainty%20climate%20change
&f=false. Cf. Freeland, supra note 4, at 299 (stating that for scientists, “research results are always provisional.
However, scientists still, provisionally, deem some propositions more worthy of belief than others.”); id. at 303
(“Science is understood to be provisional; this provisionality motivates more and more scientific study, and is thus
vital to the scientific enterprise.”).
6
Pauline Newman, Law and Science: The Testing of Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 419, 425 (2000).
7
Ethyl Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
8
Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Assessing Scientific
Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 676 (2009).
9
Id. at 676-77.
10
Jamieson, supra note 1, at 40-41; see also Jane Maienschein, James P. Collins & Daniel S. Strouse, Biology and
Law: Challenges of Adjudicating Competing Claims in A Democracy, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 151, 152 (1998) (stating that
“the interface of science and law requires adjudicating many competing claims to knowledge,” and that because
disciplines such as law and science “have different conceptions of evidence and different approaches to addressing
questions, it is difficult to integrate their research findings”); Elizabeth Mertz, Undervaluing Indeterminacy:
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science and society in order to serve certain purposes.” 11 As a result, “[t][he use of science to
inform law requires careful, multifaceted translation. We cannot just paste scientific language into
legal processes and expect lawyers to hear what scientists are saying.” 12
The ways in which scientists and lawyers (including judges) characterize scientific
uncertainty affect the formulation and application of environmental law. Holly Doremus
recognized as much in describing uncertainty as “the unifying hallmark of environmental and
natural resource regulation.” 13 If anything, the contexts in which the science is uncertain have
expanded over time, despite the ongoing accumulation of knowledge. 14
Among the environmental problems characterized by significant and persistent uncertainty
is climate change. Certain aspects of climate change science are beyond dispute among the vast
majority of reputable climate scientists. These include the existence of a warming planet and the
acknowledgment that human activity—greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and deforestation in
particular—is a contributing factor. The National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration has
pointed out that “[m]ultiple studies published in peer-reviewed scientific journals show that 97
percent or more of actively publishing climate scientists agree: Climate-warming trends over the

Translating Social Science into Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 397 (2011) (“Among the biggest challenges facing attempts
to translate between social science and law is the problem of indeterminacy. . . . [S]cholars from law and social science
approach the issue with very different frameworks. This can lead to inaccurate or distorted interdisciplinary
translations.”).
11
Jamieson, supra note 1, at 43.
12
Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Law & Science: Toward A Unified Field, 47 CONN. L. REV. 529, 543 (2014).
13
Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L.
REV. 547, 548 (2007); see also John S. Applegate & Robert L. Fischman, Foreword, 83 IND. L.J. 399, 400 (2008)
(footnotes omitted) (”The intractable form of scientific uncertainty—'knowledge uncertainty,’ as Professor Howard
Latin put it—is most frequently what the environmental law texts refer to, because intractability establishes
uncertainty as a central, inherent characteristic of environmental regulation, which environmental law and policy
must somehow manage.”); Melanie E. Kleiss, NEPA and Scientific Uncertainty: Using the Precautionary Principle
to Bridge the Gap, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (2003) (“Predicting environmental impacts always involves
uncertainty . . . .”). For discussion of some of the sources of this uncertainty, see Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities
Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 149-52 (2003).
14
See Zehr, supra note 5, at 18:
We should expect uncertainty to remain salient in public science, given the expanding number and scope of
issues that elicit scientific uncertainty. For example, the key environmental problems of the 1960s and
1970s were largely local, while the environmental issues of today have not only increased in number, but
also are national and international in scale. As the scope of these problems increased, so has the amount of
scientific uncertainty.
One definition of science is that “is the body of knowledge accumulated through the discoveries about all the things
in the universe.” Alina Bradford, What Is Science?, LIVE SCIENCE (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.livescience.com/20896-science-scientific-method.html (last visited July 7, 2021).
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past century are extremely likely due to human activities.” 15 Attribution science 16 is even making
it possible to draw causal links between climate change and specific extreme weather events. 17 For
example, scientists from the United States, Canada, and several European countries concluded that
the scorching heat wave that afflicted the Pacific Northwest in the summer of 2021 “was virtually
impossible without human-caused climate change.” 18
Nevertheless, other aspects of climate change are much harder to pin down. 19 Scientists are
unable to predict with any exactitude the magnitude of the physical effects of climate change or
exactly how those effects will differ by location. Partly, these uncertainties are due to the yet-tobe-determined nature of the human response to warnings about climate risks—will greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions continue unabated, for example, or be curtailed? 20 In addition, however,
NASA, Global Climate Change, Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming,
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last visited July 8, 2021) (citing, among other studies, John Cook et
al., Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming, 11 ENV’T
RES. LETTERS 048002, at 1 (2016), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002 (“Climate
scientists overwhelmingly agree that humans are causing recent global warming.”)). See also Michael Burger,
Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57,
60 (2020) (“There is overwhelming scientific agreement that human activities are changing the global climate
system and these changes are already affecting human and natural systems.”).
16
“Attribution of climate change has been defined as ‘the process of evaluating the relative contributions of multiple
causal factors to a change or event with an assignment of statistical confidence.’” Peter A. Stott et al., Attribution of
Extreme Weather and Climate-Related Events, 7 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24 (2016),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.380. See also Phillipe Naveau, Alexis Hannart & Aurélien
Ribes, Statistical Methods for Extreme Event Attribution in Climate Science, 7 ANNUAL REV. OF STATISTICS AND ITS
APPLICATION 89 (2020), https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-statistics-031219-041314
(discussing the science of “extreme event attribution”).
17
See Berger, Wentz & Horton, supra note 15, at 61-62 (“Significant advances in climate change detection and
attribution science—the branch of science which seeks to isolate the effect of human influence on the climate and
related earth systems—have continued to clarify the extent to which anthropogenic climate change causes both slow
onset changes and extreme events.”). Litigants are likely to rely on advances in attribution science in their efforts to
hold defendants responsible for damages resulting from extreme weather events. See id. at 63 (footnote omitted)
(“Recently, researchers have been developing methodologies to link harmful impacts that were caused or
exacerbated by climate change to specific emitters, with an eye towards holding emitters and other responsible
parties accountable in court for their contribution to the harms. As the science evolves, so too will its role in the
courtroom and in policymaking.”).
18
Western North American Extreme Heat Impossible Without Human-caused Climate Change, WORLD WEATHER
ATTRIBUTION (July 7, 2021), https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/western-north-american-extreme-heatvirtually-impossible-without-human-caused-climate-change/. The study’s authors added, however, that “because the
temperature records of June 2021 were very far outside all historical observations, determining the likelihood of this
event in today’s climate is highly uncertain.” Id.
19
See Andrew Taylor, Why the Social Cost of Carbon Is a Red Herring, 31 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 345, 363 (2018)
(footnote omitted) (stating that “while climate science has been developing rapidly, it is necessarily and admittedly
subject to a great degree of uncertainty across multiple aspects. This is to be expected as climate change is so
massive in scale and potential impact, occurs somewhat unpredictably over long periods of time, and is not
conducive to regular laboratory trials”); Wendy S. Parker & James S. Risbey, False Precision, Surprise and
Improved Uncertainty Assessment, 373 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 20140453, at 2 (2015),
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsta.2014.0453 (“But for many empirical questions of interest to
decision-makers, answers have non-negligible uncertainty. In the climate context, this is the case for many
questions.”).
20
Cf. Fred K. Morrison, Craig Manson & Matthew C. Wickerhsam, Climate Change Science and the Daubert
Standard, 44 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 391, 410 (2020) (referring to three main sources of uncertainty
in the climate models used to predict future climate change: (1) “natural internal variability which is intrinsic to the
15
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scientists engaged in assessing the future of climate change and its effects rely on global climate
models that generate simulations of future climate scenarios. Unfortunately, according to some
observers, “the limitations of these probabilistic approaches to the physical aspects of climate
change are becoming increasingly apparent. Climate models have structural errors, many of which
are shared, which challenges a probabilistic interpretation of multi-model ensembles.” 21 Feedback
loops, such as the release of frozen carbon that will result when Arctic permafrost melts, exacerbate
the uncertainty of predicting the impacts of a given level of warming. 22
The uncertainties surrounding climate change have drawn the attention of both the
scientific and legal communities. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, created in
1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme
“to provide government at all levels with scientific information that they can use to develop climate
policies,” 23 has provided the most widely publicized scientific analyses of the causes and effects
of climate change. In a series of Assessment Reports, the IPCC has addressed various aspects of
climate change, including physical science, mitigation, and adaptation. 24
The IPCC has issued five series of assessment reports, the most recent of which was
published in 2014. 25 In conjunction with the preparation of these reports, the IPCC has published
Guidance Notes to assist the lead authors of the various reports “in the consistent treatment of
climate system”; (2) “uncertainty concerning past, present and future forcing on the climate system by
anthropogenic forcing agents”; and (3) “uncertainty related to the response of the climate system to the specified
forcing agents”).
21
Theodore G. Shepherd et al., Storylines: An Alternative Approach to Representing Uncertainty in Physical
Aspects of Climate Change, 151 CLIMATIC CHANGE 555, 557 (2018),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-018-2317-9. The authors add:
Effective bias correction of multivariate relationships, such as those involved in compound events, requires
vast amounts of data that may not exist. In any case, it is not known how to correct model biases in
simulating climate changes (as opposed to simulations of the present climate state). Estimates of
uncertainties at the regional scale can quickly accumulate to a point where this knowledge hinders rather
than supports scenario-led climate adaptation decision-making.
Id. (citations omitted).
22
See Leah A. Dundon, Climate Science for Lawyers, 31-Spr. NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 20, 22 (2017) (“Despite
broad agreement that feedbacks are likely to amplify human-caused warming, there is still uncertainty as to the
degree of amplification.”); The Climate Reality Project, How Feedback Loops Are Making the Climate Crisis Worse
(Jan. 7, 2020, 8:06 am), https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/how-feedback-loops-are-making-climate-crisisworse; Monique Brouielletts, How Microbes in Permafrost Could Trigger a Massive Carbon Bomb (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00659-y.
23
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/about/ (last visited July 8,
2021).
24
The IPPC has explained that:
For the assessment reports, IPCC scientists volunteer their time to assess the thousands of scientific papers
published each year to provide a comprehensive summary of what is known about the drivers of climate
change, its impacts and future risks, and how adaptation and mitigation can reduce those risks. . . . Through
its assessments, the IPCC identifies the strength of scientific agreement in different areas and indicates
where further research is needed.
Id.
25
The sixth report is expected in 2021. In addition to the assessment reports, there are many special issue reports.
See IPCC, Reports, https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/ (last visited July 8, 2021). A dropdown menu that is available by
clicking on the term “Assessment Report” provides links to all of the assessment reports as well as the special
reports.
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uncertainties.” 26 The Note published to assist in the preparation of the Fifth Assessment Reports
“define[d] a common approach and calibrated language that can be used broadly for developing
expert judgments and for evaluating and communicating the degree of certainty in findings of the
assessment process.” 27 The Note explained that the Fifth Assessment Reports would “rely on two
metrics for communicating the degree of certainty in key findings: (1) confidence in the validity
of a finding based on the type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence; and (2) quantified
measures of uncertainty in a finding expressed probabilistically (based on statistical analysis or
expert judgment).” 28 Levels of confidence were expressed using qualifying language. 29 A finding
that a fact is “virtually certain” has a 99-1005 probability. The other qualifiers reflect lower levels
of confidence: very likely (90-100%), likely (66-100%), about as likely as not (33 to 66%),
unlikely (0-33%), very unlikely 1-10%), and exceptionally unlikely (0-1%). 30
The IPCC Guidance Notes provide perhaps the preeminent example of how scientists can
systematically describe scientific uncertainty relating to climate science in policy documentation.31
The IPCC’s system for communicating scientific uncertainty has been widely emulated by other
scientific organizations. The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), for example,
which Congress ordered the President to establish in 1990, 32 has drawn on the IPCC Guidance
Notes in describing the reliability of its conclusions concerning climate science. 33
Scientific uncertainty surrounding climate change is relevant to legal discourse as well as
to communication among scientists (and communication by scientists to policymakers and the
public). But translating scientific uncertainty, both generally and as relevant to climate change,
into legal concepts can be problematic. As noted above, scientists and lawyers may not view
uncertainty from a common vantage point. 34 As a result, “the law’s use of science is uncertain and

IPCC, Guidance Notes for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of
Uncertainties (2010), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2017/08/AR5_Uncertainty_Guidance_Note.pdf
[hereinafter Guidance Notes]. See also Michael D. Mastrandrea, The IPCC AR5 Guidance Note on Consistent
Treatment of Uncertainties: A Common Approach Across the Working Groups, 108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 675, 676
(2011), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10584-011-0178-6.pdf (“Starting with the Third Assessment
Report (TAR), guidance outlining a common approach for treatment of uncertainties across the Working Groups has
been provided to all authors in each assessment cycle,” whose purpose “has been to encourage, across the [IPCC’s]
Working Groups, consistent characterization of the degree of certainty in key findings based on the strength of and
uncertainties in the underlying knowledge base”).
27
Guidance Notes, supra note 26, at 3.
28
Id.
29
See Appendix 2, Table 5.
30
Id.
31
For descriptions of other systems for communicating these uncertainties, see Michael Traynor, Communicating
Scientific Uncertainty: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10159, 10160-62 (2015).
32
Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, § 103, 104 Stat. 3096, 3098. The Act requires the
preparation at least once every four years of an assessment that discusses the scientific uncertainties associated with
its climate science findings, analyzes the effects of climate change on the natural environment and various human
activity, and analyzes current trends and projects future trends in climate change. Id. § 106.
33
2 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2018, revised 2021),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf.
34
See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
26
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uneven.” 35 The problem is particularly acute in the context of litigation, where differences in the
training of scientists and lawyers, 36 and in the languages they use, “cause[ ] a question of
legitimacy in the evidence that is presented in court,” 37 or that is relied on by government officials
in making decisions that are challenged in court. 38
Moreover, science communication in the context of litigation typically has a different
purpose than discourse among scientists. Whereas the scientific community discusses science for
the purpose of advancing human knowledge, litigants in lawsuits such as those that implicate
climate change introduce science into the proceedings for the purpose of supporting their overall
position in litigation. 39 Acknowledging what remains unknown in scientific studies sustains
credibility in the scientific community because, as Karl Popper famously argued, “the hallmark of
scientific theory is its falsifiability.” 40 In the litigation context, the acknowledgment of scientific
uncertainty between a plaintiff’s claim of a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s harm, or between a challenged agency action and the environmental harm it will
allegedly generate, may be fatal to the litigant’s prospects of convincing a judge or jury to rule in
its favor.
There is no shortage of commentary on the treatment of scientific uncertainty in courts.41
Some of these works focus on judicial treatment of scientific uncertainty in climate litigation in
John C. Holmes, Book Review, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law, 48-Fed. FED. LAW. 68
(2001).
36
See David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists”, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2006) (“Lawyers, of which
judges are merely a subset, generally lack good training in the methods of science. Most lawyers do not speak the
language of science. Lawyers and scientists come from different worlds of education and experience.”).
37
Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in the Current Common Law
Toxic Tort System, 9 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 51–52 (2001).
38
In addition, “it can be difficult for non-scientists, such as judges, to separate out science and policy judgment
without additional assistance. When these get conflated, courts will not be able to determine when a management
decision is rationally supported by scientific evidence.” Sara A. Clark, Taking A Hard Look at Agency Science: Can
the Courts Ever Succeed?, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 343 (2009).
39
Litigation, however, is often described as a process whose goal is the search for truth. See Carroll v. Jacques
Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1997) (describing “the search for truth” as being “at the heart
of the litigation process”); Michael Moore, Tobacco Litigation, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 365, 368 (1997); but cf.
David H. Taylor, Should It Take A Thief?: Rethinking the Admission of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Civil Cases,
22 REV. LITIG. 625, 630 (2003) (“Civil litigation is not as much a search for the truth as it is a means of reaching an
acceptable resolution of a dispute.”).
40
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (quoting KARL POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)) (“[T]he criterion of
the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”); see also Barbara Pfeffer Billauer,
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws of “Falsifiability” and “Falsification”, 22
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 21, 36 (2016) (“Popper constantly reiterates that ‘falsifiability’ is the sine qua non of
science. . . .”).
41
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Richard A. Merrill, 2 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 93 (1986); Troyen A. Brennan,
Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing
Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1989); Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker,
Scientific Uncertainty Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125 (2002); Emily
Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1726-31 (2011);
Susan R. Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: Assessing Evidentiary Reliability in Toxic Tort Litigation, 1993
UTAH L. REV. 1307 (1993); Tai, supra note 8; Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 792 (1997).
35
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particular. 42 Most of these studies provided recommendations for how judges should conceptualize
scientific uncertainty in resolving cases before them. What has been missing, however, has been
empirical research assessing systematically how courts have actually addressed scientific
uncertainty reflected in briefs and other documents submitted to them by litigants or in agency
decisions that allegedly would have adverse impacts on (or would be adversely affected by) climate
change. 43
This Article presents such an empirical evaluation. It explores how federal courts addressed
uncertainty in climate science—how the judges framed scientific uncertainty in climate
litigation—in the context of lawsuits challenging agency decisions based on alleged
noncompliance with two important federal environmental statutes, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Both statutes impose analytical
obligations on federal agencies. 44 Both are important centerpieces of U.S. environmental law and
litigation as a general matter. 45 Both have already been the subject of a considerable amount of
litigation relating to the climate impacts of agency action. 46 Therefore, they present an important
testing ground for the willingness and ability of the courts to scrutinize factual information
characterized by uncertainty in climate science. 47 Whether judges are able to rise to the challenge
of fashioning meaningful responses to the characterizations of such uncertainty by scientists in and
outside agencies may go a long way toward determining whether the judicial branch is capable of
playing an important role in government efforts to manage climate change in ways that minimize
its potentially destructive clout. 48
See, e.g., Kirsten Engel & Jonathan Overpeck, Adaptation and the Courtroom: Judging Climate Science, 3 MICH.
J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2013); Petra Minnerop & Friederike Otto, Climate Change and Causation: Joining Law
and Climate Science on the Basis of Formal Logic, 27 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 49 (2020); Hari M. Osofsky, The
Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233 (2007); Natasha Geiling,
In Briefs, City of Oakland v. BP: Testing the Limits of Climate Science in Climate Litigation, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683,
684 (2019); Jill Jaffe, Note, Scientific Uncertainty and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air
Act, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 765 (2010); Leah Vasarhelyi, Note, Political Accountability and Judicial Review in the
Context of Climate Change Regulation, 32 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL L. REV. 159 (2021).
43
David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or
Business As Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012) [hereinafter Markell & Ruhl, Assessment], provides an early
empirical evaluation of climate litigation, but it does not focus on scientific uncertainty or judicial treatment of it.
The same is true of David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in the United
States, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10644 (2010) [hereinafter Markell & Ruhl, Survey].
44
See infra Part IVA.
45
David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Ideology as a Check on Executive Power, 81 OHIO ST. L.J.
175, 196 (2020) (“NEPA and the ESA are among the most important and most heavily litigated federal
environmental statutes.”). Based on the Sabin Center database of climate litigation which we used to generate the
cases we studied, as of July 9, 2021, the statute which had generated the most domestic climate litigation was NEPA
(311 cases). The ESA and other wildlife protection statutes gave rise to 158 cases. Only the Clean Air Act (CAA)
spurred more cases (214) than the ESA. No other federal environmental statute came close. U.S. Climate Change
Litigation, http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/us-climate-change-litigation/ (last visited July 9,
2021). We chose not to include cases decided under the federal CAA because only seven met the criteria for
inclusion in our database, See infra Appendix 2, Graph 1).
46
See infra Part IVA.
47
“Climate litigation allows study of the role of U.S. courts in the co-production of knowledge, in shaping ethical
debates, and in the relationship between law and ethics in general.” Marilyn Averill, Climate Litigation: Ethical
Implications and Societal Impacts, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 902 (2008).
48
More than a decade ago, Professors Markell and Ruhl noted that “[s]ome commentators have suggested that the
courts are already significant drivers of climate change policy, and their role is likely to increase.” Markell & Ruhl,
42
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We analyzed 51 lawsuits in which federal judges in NEPA and ESA cases confronted
scientific uncertainty in ruling on the validity of agency decisions with climate-related
implications. 49 Although courts are strongly inclined to defer to agency resolution of complex
scientific issues, and they did exactly that in a majority of the cases we surveyed, they declared
agency reasoning in the treatment of scientific uncertainty to be arbitrary and capricious in a
considerable number of cases.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief summary of the methodology we
used in identifying and analyzing the cases. 50 Part III reviews the provisions of NEPA and the
ESA, focusing on those that are most likely to be implicated when agencies performing their duties
under the two statutes encounter issues on which the science is unresolved.
Part IV describes both our quantitative and qualitative findings. Section A covers the
quantitative analysis, answering a series of questions concerning the characteristics of the cases in
our database and the manner in which the courts resolved them. Section B provides qualitative
analysis of judicial review of agency treatment of scientific uncertainty under the arbitrary and
capricious standard of judicial review. It both discerns patterns in both the cases that turned aside
litigants’ challenges to agency scientific determination and identifies factors that triggered what
was in some cases surprisingly rigorous judicial scrutiny of agency approaches to decisionmaking
in contexts of scientific uncertainty.
Part V concludes. It discusses the implications of the cases we reviewed for the future of
agency treatment of climate science and litigation in which it is challenged. It also points the way
to possible future research endeavors to further illuminate how courts are likely to preserve the
delicate balance between deferential review of technical determinations by expert agencies and
judicial intervention when agency reasoning in making those determinations is deficient.
II. A Methodological Summary
To assemble the data for this Article, we began with a database of 838 cases initially
compiled for another empirical evaluation of climate litigation in which two of us participated.51
That database included all lawsuits involving climate change 52 filed in federal or state courts in
Survey, supra note 43, at 10646. Cf. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government
in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 12 YALE L.J. 350, 370-71 (2011) (taking issue with those who minimize the judicial
role in climate-related tort litigation). Others have studied the role that courts have played in the formulation of
climate policy in other parts of the world. See Meredith Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of
Non-U.S. Climate Litigation, 26 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 131, 134 (2015).
49
For a list of the 51 cases, see Appendix 1.
50
We describe that methodology more thoroughly in Appendix 2.
51
Sabrina McCormick et al., Strategies in and Outcomes of Climate Change Litigation in the United States, 8
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 829 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0240-8.
52
Sabin Center staff compile their charts by searching Westlaw’s databases for cases that have some substantive
nexus with GHG mitigation, climate change impacts, or climate adaptation, and through daily review of news
articles in publications that cover environmental and energy law and policy that have a particular climate focus.
Markell & Ruhl, Assessment, supra note 43, built their analysis from the Sabin Center database. Emails from
Margaret Barry to Daniel Kim (July 27 & 29, 2017 (on file with authors). See also Markell & Ruhl, supra, at 27
(“We decided to define climate change litigation as any piece of federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or
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the United States between 1990 and 2016 that were identified by the Columbia University Law
School Sabin Center for Climate Change Litigation Chart. 53 The Sabin Center database includes
the date each lawsuit was filed, its current status, a short description of the lawsuit, and the identity
of the plaintiffs and defendants. The Chart also provides links to documents such as complaints
and judicial decisions.
The team for the earlier research effort coded each lawsuit in the Sabin Center database
according to the level of science (either climate or non-climate-related) discussed in the documents
in that case file (e.g., court opinion, settlement order, brief). The team defined the level of science
used as the number of words/terminologies/phrases mentioned in any court document that
indicated any mention or discussion of scientific information relating to a legal issue in the case. 54
The team then manually checked each document that contained a flagged term to determine
whether the flagged terms were actually indicative of discussion of scientific information. If
flagged terms appeared in a part of the document discussing climate science (e.g., climatology)
and qualified as climate-related scientific evidence, it counted as one instance of climate science
evidence being discussed in the case. If the relevant words were in a part of the document
discussing any other science (e.g., non-climate science, economics), it qualified as non-climate
scientific evidence and was counted as one instance of non-climate science evidence being
discussed in the case. Depending on the number of instances of references in a document to climate
or non-climate scientific evidence, the team coded the document as “no science discussed,” “court
engaged in scientific discussion,” “science important, but not central,” or “science central.”
For this Article, we modified the database of 838 lawsuits that emerged from the earlier
study in four ways. First, we excluded all cases that were not filed in a federal administrative or
judicial forum. Second, we excluded cases coded as “no science discussed.” Third, we updated the
database by adding federal lawsuits identified in the Sabin Center Chart in which scientific
evidence was discussed and filed between 2016 to 2018. 55 Fourth, we merged cases decided at
different levels (e.g., a district court case that was later reviewed by a circuit court of appeals) into
a single case, using the decision handed down at the highest level. 56 The final database included
222 climate-related federal lawsuits filed from 1990 to 2018 in which scientific evidence is
discussed.

judicial litigation in which the party filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact or law
regarding the substance or policy of climate change causes and impacts.”).
53
For a current version of the chart, see U.S. Climate Change Litigation, http://climatecasechart.com/climatechange-litigation/us-climate-change-litigation/ (last visited July 9, 2021).
54
We used the following list of search terms to highlight areas where the court may be discussing scientific evidence
to determine the impact of the evidence on the court’s decisions: science, scientific, greenhouse gas, GHG,
emission, emit, air, quality, qualitative, quantify, quantitative, global warming, climate, climate change, data,
evidence, research, expert, report, comment, study, witness, testimony, testify, IPCC, health, public health, -ology, logic, -logical.
55
We coded every lawsuit based on the year filed and the year decided. The cutoff date for inclusion in our database
for this Article for the “year filed” was December 31, 2018. The cutoff date for the “year decided” was June 30,
2020. We coded lawsuits filed before December 31, 2018 but decided after June 30, 2020 as “pending.”
56
For cases decided at the district court and appellate court levels, we analyzed both decisions, but coded the cases
as deference or no deference cases based on the appellate court decision.
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For each of the remaining 222 cases, we collected all publicly available documents from
each lawsuit (i.e., 5,695 documents in total). 57 We then sorted those documents into one of six
author groups: plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff’s amici, defendant’s amici, court, and other. We
created a folder for each case, using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software package, 58 with
subfolders for each author group (i.e., plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff’s amici, defendant’s amici,
court, and other) within a case. Any additional documents were included in the case’s general file
but outside of any of the author group subfolders.
In an attempt to select the group of climate lawsuits in which judges engaged in discussion
of scientific uncertainty, we took a two-step approach with the database of 222 court opinions: text
coding using NVivo and manual qualitative analysis. 59 Through this two-step approach, we
compiled a final database of 51 cases brought under NEPA and ESA against federal agencies in
which scientific uncertainty figures prominently in the courts’ opinions. We then analyzed the
sample and divided the cases into two groups: cases in which the court granted deference to
agencies’ use of science and cases in which the court did not. As Part IV explains, we found that
there are recurring themes among the cases falling under each type regarding how judges reflect
on scientific uncertainty in their rulings.
III. Agency Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty Under NEPA and
the ESA
Both NEPA and the ESA require agencies to steep themselves in scientific determinations
concerning the environmental impacts of their actions. Both require agencies to make predictive
judgments, and both engender decisionmaking when the available science is unable to justify
definitive conclusions in making those judgments. This Part briefly summarizes the requirements
imposed on agencies by NEPA and the ESA, focusing on the statutory and regulatory provisions
(or judicial interpretations of those provisions) that are most relevant to decisionmaking under
conditions of scientific uncertainty. It is the agencies’ compliance or noncompliance with those
provisions that is most likely to be determinative in judicial review of agency actions in climate
cases that involve scientific uncertainty.
A. Scientific Uncertainty and NEPA
Kicking off the environmental decade of the 1970s, the adoption of NEPA codified a
national policy of “encourag[ing] productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment and “promot[ing] efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment

Most documents were downloaded from the Westlaw database. If a case was not available from Westlaw, we
returned to the Sabin Center Chart and downloaded the documents available on the page for that case. For cases
appearing in neither Westlaw nor the Sabin Center databased, we searched the web using Google for case materials.
58
NVivo is “a software package that allows [one] to categorize key words and phrases according to topics and
interrelated themes, while also ensuring that the coded data are organized in a meaningful and user-friendly
manner.” Mellisa Holtzman, Family Definitions and Children’s Rights in Custody Decision Making: The
Importance of a Changing Litigant Context, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 591, 594 (2011). See NVivo,
https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home/ (last visited July 9, 2021).
59
For further discussion, see Appendix 2.
57
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and biosphere.” 60 NEPA declared that the federal government has a continuing responsibility to
“attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health
or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences.” 61
NEPA’s most important provision directs all federal agencies to prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS) in connection with proposals for “major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.” 62 An EIS must describe, among other things, the
environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided if the proposed action is implemented, alternatives to the proposed action, and any
irreversible and irretrievable resource commitments if a proposal were implemented. 63 Agencies
can avoid preparing an EIS if a particular action falls within a category of actions that the agency
has previously determined “normally do not have a significant effect on the human environment”
and there are no extraordinary circumstances indicating that “a normally excluded action may have
a significant effect.” 64 Even if a proposed action does not qualify for such a categorical exclusion,
the agency proposing it may avoid the duty to prepare an EIS by preparing an environmental
assessment (EA) that includes a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) supported by
“sufficient evidence and analysis.” 65 Figure 1 provides a flow chart indicating how agencies
determine whether a proposed action is categorically excluded, the proper subject of an EA, or one
that requires preparation of an EIS.

42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2020).
Id. § 4331(b)(3).
62
Id. § 4332(2)(C).
63
Id.
64
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. Federal agencies may escape NEPA compliance obligations for several other reasons. See id.
§ 1501.1(a) (listing circumstances in which NEPA or its EIS preparation requirement may not apply).
65
Id. § 1501.5(a), (c)(1). NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the Executive Office of
the President. 42 U.S.C. § 4342. CEQ has issued regulations which provide that they are “applicable to and binding
on all Federal agencies for implementing the procedural provisions of [NEPA]. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 15003.(a). See also
id. §§ 1500.1(b) (“The regulations in this subchapter implement section 102(2) of NEPA. They provide direction to
Federal agencies to determine what actions are subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements and the level of NEPA
review where applicable.”), 1507.1 (“All agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the regulations in
this subchapter.”).
The CEQ regulations define a finding of no significant impact as “a document by a Federal agency briefly
presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise categorically excluded (§ 1501.4 of this chapter), will not have a
significant effect on the human environment and for which an environmental impact statement therefore will not be
prepared.” Id. § 1508.1(l). The regulations define an environmental assessment to mean a “concise public document
prepared by a Federal agency to aid an agency’s compliance with the Act and support its determination of whether
to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact . . . .” Id. § 1508.1(h).
60
61
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Figure 1. The NEPA Process

Source: COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEPA; HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 8
(2021), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021/01/f82/ceq-citizens-guide-to-nepa-2021.pdf.

NEPA is designed to ensure that federal agencies “stop and think” about the potential
impacts of their decisions on the natural environment and to publicly disclose the results of those
deliberations. 66 As one of us has explained elsewhere, however:
[t]he NEPA documentation process . . . does not always square with the nature of a dynamic
natural system in a state of disequilibrium. Particularly when an agency is considering a
long-term project, a project covering expansive tracts of land, or an action likely to affect
See Robert L. Glicksman & Alejandro E. Camacho, The Trump Card: Tarnishing Planning, Democracy, and the
Environment, 50 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10281, 10283 (2020); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(a) (“The
purpose and function of NEPA is satisfied if Federal agencies have considered relevant environmental information,
and the public has been informed regarding the decision-making process.”), 1502.1 (“The primary purpose of an
environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of NEPA is to ensure agencies consider the
environmental impacts of their actions in decision making. It shall provide full and fair discussion of significant
environmental impacts and shall inform decision makers and the public of reasonable alternatives that would avoid
or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.”).
66
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(or be affected by) climate change, it may have great difficulty predicting the course of
events or foreseeing how its proposed action will affect a resource or ecosystem it is
charged with protecting. 67
How, then, can agencies comply with their environmental evaluation and reporting responsibilities
if the potential effects of a proposed major federal action 68 are shrouded in uncertainty?
NEPA itself does not answer this conundrum, specifying only that an EIS must describe a
proposed action’s environmental effects, alternatives to the proposed action, and irreversible
resource commitments that would occur if the action were implemented. 69 The CEQ regulations,
however, provide some guidance on how agencies should function in a context of scientific
uncertainty. The regulations require that agencies “[i]dentify environmental effects and values in
adequate detail so the decision maker can appropriately consider such effects and values alongside
economic and technical analyses.” 70 Agencies must prepare EISs “using an interdisciplinary
approach that will ensure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts. 71 Agencies must “ensure the professional integrity, including scientific
integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental documents. Agencies shall make use
of reliable existing data and resources. Agencies may make use of any reliable data sources, such
as remotely gathered information or statistical models.” 72 CEQ’s position, however, is that
“[a]gencies are not required to undertake new scientific and technical research to inform their
analyses.” 73
The CEQ regulations address directly the possibility that the consequences of a proposed
action will be unknown or even unknowable. An EIS must describe the environment to be affected
by the proposed action, “including the reasonably foreseeable environmental trends and planned
actions in the area(s).” 74 The regulations also provide that “[w]hen an agency is evaluating
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment in an environmental
impact statement, and there is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall make clear

Robert L. Glicksman & Jarryd Page, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How to Reconcile Predictive Assessment
in the Face of Uncertainty with Natural Resource Management Flexibility and Success, 46 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.,
Issue # 1 (forthcoming).
68
The CEQ regulations define a major federal action as “an activity or decision subject to Federal control and
responsibility” that “may include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly
financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by Federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations,
plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(q). The regulations provide that a
major federal action tends to fall into one of several categories, including adoption of (i) official policy such as
regulations; (ii) formal plans which prescribe alternative uses of federal resources upon which future actions will be
based; (iii) programs such as groups of actions to implement a plan or policy, or systematic and connected agency
actions allocating resources; and (iv) approval of specific projects in a defined geographic area, including actions
approved by permit or other regulatory decision. Id § 1508.1(q)(3).
69
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
70
40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(b)(2).
71
Id. § 1502.6.
72
Id. § 1502.23.
73
Id.
74
Id. § 1502.15.
67
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that such information is lacking.” 75 The regulations add that “[i]f the incomplete but available
information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts is essential to a
reasoned choice among alternatives, and the overall costs of obtaining it are not unreasonable, the
agency shall include the information in the environmental impact statement.” 76 If, however, an
agency cannot obtain the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
impacts because the costs of doing so are unreasonable or the means to obtain it are unknown, the
EIS must state that the information is incomplete or unavailable, describe the relevance of the
incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable adverse environmental
impacts, summarize existing credible evidence relevant to evaluating those impacts, and base its
evaluation on theoretical approaches or research methods that are generally accepted in the
scientific community. 77
Regulatory definitions further flesh out the meaning of these requirements. CEQ defines
“effects or impacts” as:
changes to the human environment from the proposed action or alternatives that are
reasonably foreseeable and have a reasonably close causal relationship to the proposed
action or alternatives, including those effects that occur at the same time and place as the
proposed action or alternatives and may include effects that are later in time or farther
removed in distance from the proposed action or alternatives. 78
75
Id. § 1502.21(a). For these purposes, “reasonably foreseeable” impacts include those “that have catastrophic
consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported
by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.” Id. § 1502.21(d).
See generally Mark Reeve, Scientific Uncertainty and the National Environmental Policy Act-the Council on
Environmental Quality’s Regulation 40 C.F.R. Section 1502.22, 60 WASH. L. REV. 101 (1984) (discussing the
version of the regulation that was in effect before it was amended in 2020). For a discussion of the 2020 revisions,
see Steph Tai, Scientific Uncertainty and the Council on Environmental Quality's Proposed Changes to Its National
Environmental Policy Act Regulations, ABA TRENDS, May/June 2020, at 11.
76
40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(b).
77
Id. § 1502.21(c). Before the adoption of the 2020 amendments, which occurred after the close of our survey
period, the regulation dealing with incomplete or unavailable information appeared at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2019).
Surprisingly, this regulation was not cited by courts in their review of agency treatment of scientific uncertainty in
the vast majority of the cases in our survey, even though it would seem to be directly relevant. One case in which a
court did address § 1502.22 is WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 828 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Colo. 2011).
ENGOs brought a NEPA challenge to the Forest Service’s approval of coal mining operations in a national forest.
The plaintiffs argued that the agency’s EIS failed to adequately analyze the cumulative impacts of methane venting
on climate change. The Forest Service responded that it could not estimate the effect of the project on climate
change because of the lack of appropriate models and research. The court rejected the claim that the agency acted
arbitrarily, finding that it complied with § 1502.22 by providing a statement that information concerning the precise
impact of flaring on climate change was unavailable and could not be credibly calculated. The plaintiffs failed to
identify any method that would have filled that knowledge gap. Id. at 1239-40. See also High Country Conservation
Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 333 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1130-31 (D. Colo. 2018), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 951 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding that the Forest Service complied with § 1502.22 by disclosing
reasonably foreseeable effects on climate change of proposed exploration and coal mining activities).
78
40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(g). Before 2020, the CEQ regulations required agencies to consider “cumulative effects,
which they defined as “the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency . . . . undertakes
such other actions.” See Bark v. U.S. Forest Serv., 958 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7).
The 2020 regulations replaced regulations initially adopted in 1978. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the
Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020). The pre-2020
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The regulations direct agencies generally not to consider effects “if they are remote in time,
geographically remote, or the product of a lengthy causal chain.” 79 They also define “reasonably
foreseeable” as “sufficiently likely to occur such that a person of ordinary prudence would take it
into account in reaching a decision.” 80
Thus, the CEQ regulations seek to reconcile agency obligations to assess and disclose the
potential environmental effects of their proposed actions with the possibility that those effects may
be uncertain at the time the agency prepares its NEPA documentation. They limit agency
responsibility to including assessment of the effects of only future actions that are reasonably
foreseeable and to effects that themselves are reasonably foreseeable. Remoteness in time or
distance may justify exclusion of effects from an EA or an EIS, and agency obligations to perform
research to minimize or eliminate uncertainty are limited by cost considerations. Nevertheless,
agencies must comply with NEPA in a manner consistent with scientific integrity and make use of
reliable existing data and resources. Further, as the courts have recognized, they must provide “a
reasonable, good faith objective presentation of the topics [NEPA] requires an [EIS] to cover,”
including analysis of reasonably foreseeable actions and impacts. 81
B. Scientific Uncertainty and the ESA
The ESA, like NEPA, requires agencies whose actions may result in adverse environmental
impacts to predict and evaluate those impacts—in this case, on species listed by one of two federal
agencies, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) within the Interior Department or the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within the Department of Commerce, 82 as threatened 83 or
regulations also defined “effect” to include “indirect effects,” which are caused by the action and are later in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2019), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2019-title40-vol37/pdf/CFR-2019-title40-vol37.pdf.
These two cases were part of our original database of 838 lawsuits, but do not appear in our final list of 51
cases. These cases were excluded by the NVivo software that searched for cases based on the list of codes that
appears in Appendix 2 indicating any discussion of scientific uncertainty.
79
40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(g)(2).
80
Id. § 1508.1(aa). Individual agencies may adopt their own, supplemental NEPA implementation regulations. The
Interior Department, for example, has issued NEPA regulations that define “reasonably foreseeable future actions”
as “those federal and non-federal activities not yet undertaken, but sufficiently likely to occur, that a Responsible
Official of ordinary prudence would take such activities into account in reaching a decision,” but excluding “actions
that are highly speculative or indefinite.” 43 C.F.R. § 46.30.
81
Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1174 (10th Cir. 2002), modified on reh’g, 319
F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Colorado Env’t Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999)); see
also Western Watersheds Project v. Christiansen, 348 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1208 (D. Wyo. 2018) (quoting WildEarth
Guardians v. National Park Service 703 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2013)) (“An agency need not include every
possible alternative, nor analyze consequences of alternatives it has in good faith rejected ‘as too remote,
speculative, or . . . impractical or ineffective’”); Surfrider Found. v. Dalton, 989 F. Supp. 1309, 1324 (S.D. Cal.
1998), aff’d, 196 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[t]he term ‘reasonably’ suggests that the agency must make
a good faith effort to consider likely cumulative effects”).
82
The FWS has primary responsibility for terrestrial and freshwater organisms, and the NMFS is responsible for
marine mammals, reptiles, fish, and plants. See Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Navy, 733 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 2013).
83
A threatened species is one “which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2020).
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endangered. 84 Thus, the ESA, like NEPA, often places agencies in the position of evaluating and
describing impacts that cannot yet be fully ascertained.
The ESA’s purposes “are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered and threatened species may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the
conservation” of those species. 85 In adopting the ESA, Congress declared a policy that all federal
agencies “shall seek to conserve endangered and threatened species and shall utilize their
authorities” to promote the ESA’s purposes. 86 The ESA provisions most relevant to this Article
are § 4, which governs the listing and delisting of species and the designation of their critical
habitat; 87 § 7, which imposes an affirmative duty on all federal agencies to carry out programs for
the conservation of listed species 88 and a duty to ensure that their actions are not likely to
jeopardize listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of their critical
habitat; 89 and § 9, which makes it unlawful for any person to take any listed species. 90
Scientific uncertainty concerning climate change and other matters can affect (and has
affected) the application of these provisions. When deciding whether to list a species, the Services
(the FWS or the NMFS) must consider several factors that necessarily require predictive judgments
about the future of a species’ fate. These include the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; overutilization for commercial or other
purposes; disease or predation; the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; and other
natural or manmade factors affecting the continued existence of the species. 91 The ESA requires
that the Services make listing determinations “solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available . . . after conducting a review of the status of the species” and taking
into account efforts being made by other governmental entities to protect the species. 92 Neither the
ESA nor the joint FWS-NMFS implementing regulations define the term “best scientific and
commercial data available.” 93
The jointly issued FWS-NMFS regulations provide that in determining whether a species
is threatened, the Services must:
An endangered species is one “which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.
. . .” Id. § 1532(6).
85
Id. § 1531(b).
86
Id. § 1531(c)(1).
87
Id. § 1533. Section 4 also requires the FWS and the NMFS to develop and implement recovery plans for the
conservation and survival of listed species. Id. § 1533(f)(1). The weight of judicial opinion is that recovery plans are
not binding on the agencies that develop them. See, e.g., Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432-34
(D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Conservation Cong. v. Finley, 774 F.3d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Friends of
Blackwater) (stating that “while they provide guidance for the conservation of those species, they are not binding
authorities”).
88
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
89
Id. § 1536(a)(2).
90
Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
91
Id. § 1533(a)(1).
92
Id. § 1533(b)(1); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b).
93
But cf. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information
Standards Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 16022 (July 1, 1994) (announcing interagency policy to
provide criteria, establish procedures, and provide guidance to ensure that decisions made by the Services under the
ESA represent the best scientific and commercial data available).
84
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analyze whether the species is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future. The term foreseeable future extends only so far into the future as the
Services can reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species’ responses
to those threats are likely. The Services will describe the foreseeable future on a case-bycase basis, using the best available data and taking into account considerations such as the
species’ life-history characteristics, threat-projection timeframes, and environmental
variability. The Services need not identify the foreseeable future in terms of a specific
period of time. 94
By definition, determining whether a species is threatened requires a projection of the future
condition of the species, whose status could well be affected by climate change and other events
and circumstances that are not known at the time of the designation decision.
The ESA requires the Services to designate critical habitat for a species concurrently with
listing it, “to the maximum extent prudent and determinable.” 95 Critical habitat designations must
be made “on the basis of the best scientific data available” after taking into account economic and
other factors. 96 The Services may exclude an area from critical habitat upon a determination that
the benefits of the exclusion outweigh the benefits of inclusion, unless the agency determines,
“based on the best scientific and commercial data available,” that exclusion will result in species
extinction. 97 The joint regulations allow the Services to forego critical habitat designation if it is
not prudent or determinable, and provide that designation is not determinable when either data
sufficient to perform required analyses are lacking or the biological needs of the species are not
sufficiently well known to identify an area that qualifies as critical habitat. 98 The repeated
references to reliance on the best available data reflect a recognition that listing and critical habitat
designation determinations must often be made despite uncertainty about the present and future
status of the species under consideration.
As noted above, § 7 of the ESA requires each federal agency to ensure that any action it
authorizes, funds, or carries out not be likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of the species’ habitat. 99
Agencies must do so based on “the best scientific and commercial data available.” 100 Further, they
50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
96
Id. § 1533(b)(2); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a).
97
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); see also 50 C.F,R. § 424.19(c).
98
50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2). The ESA defines critical habitat as (1) the areas occupied by the species at the time of
listing on which are found “physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II)
which may require special management considerations or protection”; and (ii) areas outside the area occupied by the
species at the time of listing upon a determination that the areas are essential for the conservation of the species. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). For interpretation of these provisions, see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv.,
139 S. Ct. 361 (2018).
99
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The joint FWS-NMFS regulations define jeopardize to mean “to engage in an action that
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.” 50
C.F.R. § 402.02.They define “destruction or adverse modification” as “a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably
diminishes the value of critical habitat as a whole for the conservation of a listed species.” Id.
100
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
94
95
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must do so in consultation with either one of the Services. 101 Figure 2 provides a flow chart of the
ESA § 7 consultation process.
Figure 2. Endangered Species Consultation Process (Section 7)

Source: Endangered Species Consultation: Why Does It Take So Long?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July 23, 2014),
https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/baseload/endangered-species-consultation-why-does-it-take-so-long/#gref

The ESA § 7 consultation process is analogous in some respects to the NEPA compliance
process in that the joint implementing regulations require different procedures and the preparation
of different documents based on the likelihood and severity of an action’s impact on listed species.
Each agency must confer with the appropriate Service on any action which is likely to violate §
7(a)(2). 102 Any agency may prepare a biological assessment in cooperation with the appropriate
Service. 103 The assessment evaluates the potential effects of a proposed action on listed species
and designated and proposed critical habitat for the purpose of determining whether any listed
species or habitat are likely to be adversely affected and whether formal consultation with the
Service is necessary. 104 Its purpose is to help the action agency determine whether formal
consultation with the Service is necessary. If the assessment indicates that the action is not likely
to cause jeopardy or result in damage to habitat, the agency need not consult further with the
FWS. 105 If a listed species or critical habitat may be present in the action area and the action agency

101

Id.
50 C.F.R. § 402.10(a).
103
If the Service advises that no listed species or critical habitat may be affected, the action agency need not prepare
a biological assessment and further consultation is unnecessary. Id. § 402.12(d)(1). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c).
104
40 C.F.R. § 402.12(a)-(b)(1).
105
Id. § 402.24(k)(1). The regulations provide for optional informal consultation between the Service and the action
agency to assist the action agency in determining whether formal consultation is required. Id. § 402.13(a). If the
action agency decides, with the Service’s concurrence, after informal consultation that its action is not likely to
adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, formal consultation is not required. Id. § 402.13(c).
102
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prepares a biological assessment, that agency must submit the assessment to the Service to
determine whether it concurs with its findings. 106
If the action agency determines that its action may affect listed species or critical habitat,
formal consultation is required, unless, after informal consultation or preparation of a biological
assessment the agency determines, with the Service’s written concurrence, that the proposed action
is not likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat. 107 Any federal agency
requesting formal consultation must provide the Service with the best scientific and commercial
data available or which can be obtained during the consultation for an adequate review of the
effects the action may have on listed species or critical habitat. 108
During formal consultation, the Service must, among other things, evaluate the effects of
the action and the cumulative effects on listed species or critical habitat. 109 The regulations define
“effects” as consequences to listed species or critical habitat “that are caused by the proposed
action . . . . A consequence is caused by the proposed action if it would not occur but for the
proposed action and it is reasonably certain to occur. Effects of the action may occur later in time
and may include consequences occurring outside the immediate area involved in the action.”110
The regulations further provide that “[a] conclusion of reasonably certain to occur must be based
on clear and substantial information, using the best scientific and commercial data available.”111
An effect may be deemed not having been caused by an action based on temporal or geographic
remoteness or the presence of “a lengthy causal chain that involves so many steps as to make the
consequence not reasonably certain to occur.” 112
The Services’ definition of cumulative effects is evocative of the NEPA regulations that
call for evaluation of reasonably foreseeable actions and impacts. The ESA regulations define
cumulative effects as those “that are reasonably certain to occur within” the area of the action
subject to consultation. 113 The regulations again specify that a conclusion of “reasonably certain
to occur must be based on clear and substantial information, using the best scientific and
commercial data available.” 114 These provisions all require predictive judgments whose accuracy
and reliability may be affected by scientific uncertainty.
At the end of the consultation process, the Service must prepare a biological opinion. The
opinion must specify whether the Service has determined that the action is or is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of its critical habitat. 115 If the Service issues a jeopardy opinion, it must include

Id. § 402.24(j).
Id. § 402.14(a)-(b)(1).
108
Id. § 402.14(d).
109
Id. § 402.14(g)(3).
110
Id. § 402.02.
111
Id. § 402.17(b).
112
Id.
113
Id. § 402.02.
114
Id. § 402.17(a).
115
Id. § 402.14(h)(1)(iv). The former finding results in a “jeopardy biological opinion,” while the later results in a
“no jeopardy biological opinion. Id.
106
107
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reasonable and prudent alternatives, 116 which are alternatives that can be implemented in a manner
consistent with the intended purpose of the action, that are within the action agency’s legal
authority, that are economically and technologically feasible, and that the Service “believes would
avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of listed species or resulting in the
destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.” 117 Formal consultation ends upon issuance
of a biological opinion. 118
If the Service concludes that an action and the resultant incidental take of listed species
will not violate § 7(a)(2), it must include in a biological opinion an incidental take statement
(ITS). 119 Incidental takes are those “that result from, but are not the purpose of, carrying out an
otherwise lawful activity conducted by the Federal agency or applicant.” 120 An ITS describes the
impact of the incidental take on the species, reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the
impact, and terms and conditions to implement those measures. 121 If, during the course of the
action the amount or extent of incidental take allowed by the ITS is exceeded, the action agency
must reinitiate consultation. 122 Any take that complies with an ITS does not qualify as a taking
prohibited by § 9 of the ESA. 123
The final provision that is potentially relevant to our study is the § 9 take prohibition.124
Any person, including a private individual or business or a federal agency, may violate the take
prohibition. 125 The take prohibition does not implicate scientific uncertainty as obviously as the
ESA’s listing and consultation provisions do. But even here, predictive judgments are relevant and
may be affected by that uncertainty. The ESA, for example, defines “take” to include harass. 126
The joint FWS-NMFS regulations define harass as “an intentional or negligent act or omission
which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or
sheltering.” 127
Various permitting provisions also may be affected by uncertainty. ESA regulations
provide for the issuance of permits authorizing otherwise prohibited takes for scientific purposes,
enhancement of species propagation or survival, or incidental takes. 128 In ruling on a permit for
scientific purposes or enhancement of survival, the Service must consider the probable direct and
indirect effects which permit issuance would have on affected wild populations, and whether the
permit’s purpose would be likely to reduce the threat of extinction facing the species of affected

Id. § 402.14(h)(2); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
50 C.F,R. § 402.02.
118
Id. § 402.24(m)(1).
119
Id. § 402.14(i)(1); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
120
50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
121
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1).
122
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(4).
123
Id. § 402.14(i)(5).
124
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
125
See id. § 1532(13) (defining person).
126
Id. § 1532(19).
127
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (emphasis added).
128
Id. § 17.22.
116
117
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wildlife. 129 The Service may not issue an incidental take permit unless it concludes that the taking
to be authorized “will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild.” 130 Further, the regulations authorize imposition of additional conservation
and mitigation requirements on permit holders if it deems them necessary to respond to unforeseen
circumstances. 131
The ESA’s mandates that the FWS and the NMFS premise their regulatory decisions on
the best available scientific evidence available implicitly recognize that the agencies must
necessarily operate at times without access to definitive scientific answers. The regulatory
provisions requiring the Services to consider effects that are reasonably certain to occur likewise
recognize the need for predictive judgments. Climate change presents a host of scientific questions
for which answers are not currently available, and climate science turns on modeling and other
predictive judgments. 132 Our study sought to determine how the federal courts evaluated agency
efforts to respond to these kinds of challenges.
III. Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Scientific Uncertainty in Climate Litigation
To determine how the federal courts have responded to the challenge of applying legal
doctrines to uncertainty in climate science, as presented to the courts in litigation brought under
NEPA and the ESA, we engaged in both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 51 cases in
our database. In Section A of this Part, we present a general overview of the 51 cases using
univariate and bivariate descriptive statistical analysis, 133 which provides answers to several key
questions about the nature of the litigated climate cases that involve scientific uncertainty. Part B
presents the qualitative research methods that we used to analyze the textual data mined from the
court opinions. That analysis gleans from the cases descriptions of the situations in which the
courts applied deferential non-deferential review of agency efforts to address scientific uncertainty
in carrying out their NEPA and ESA duties.
A.

Quantitative Analysis of the Case Results

Among the questions that interested us was what kinds of litigants brought suits in which
the courts were most likely to engage on issues that prompted discussion of scientific uncertainty.
We found that the main plaintiffs for these lawsuits were environmental nongovernmental
organizations (ENGOs). Out of the 51 climate cases in our database in which courts discussed
scientific uncertainty, 40 cases were filed by ENGOs (Table 1). The ENGOs frequently initiating
lawsuits that triggered discussion of scientific uncertainty include the Center for Biological
Diversity (CBD), Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC).
Id. § 17.22(a)(2)(ii), (iv).
Id. § 17.22(b)(2)(D); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
131
50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(iii)(B). Unforeseen circumstances are those that could not reasonably have been
anticipated at the time a habitat conservation plan was negotiated in connection with an application for an incidental
take permit. Id. § 17.3
132
See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
133
Univariate analysis is the analysis of one variable. Bivariate analysis is the analysis of two variables. Descriptive
statistical analysis describes the basic statistical features of the data.
129
130
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Table 1. Type of plaintiffs and defendants and the number of cases for each plaintiff v. defendant
Agency (defendant)
ENGO (plaintiff)
Industry (plaintiff)
Local Gov (plaintiff)
Army Corps
3
0
0
BLM
4
0
0
BOEM
0
0
1
DOI – other
1
0
0
FERC
2
0
0
FHWA
1
0
0
Forest Service
5
0
0
FWS
9
2
1
Multiple Agency
8
0
0
NHTSA
1
0
1
NOAA
4
2
0
State Department
1
0
0
STB
1
0
0
Total
40
4
3

Individual (plaintiff)
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
4

Total
3
6
1
1
2
1
5
13
8
2
6
1
2
51

Another question was which agencies were defendants in lawsuits in which the courts
addressed scientific uncertainty. The federal agencies frequently sued include the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) (see Table 1). Most of
the disputes in our database involved challenges by ENGOs to federal agencies that had approved
development projects with potential adverse environmental effects.
We were also interested in ascertaining whether judicial treatment of scientific uncertainty
in climate litigation shifted over time. On the one hand, as climate issues become more familiar,
courts might become more comfortable addressing the science brought to their attention by
litigants. On the other hand, if continuing scientific research (such as research involving attribution
science) sheds new light on the mechanisms and impacts of climate change, there might be less
uncertainty for the agencies and courts to discuss.
Graph 1 shows how many cases in our database were decided each year in the time period
covered by our search. It shows that the number of opinions that discussed scientific uncertainty
generally increased over time, first gradually and then more sharply, although there was a drop off
in later years. In 2016, there was a peak, with 10 cases in which the judges discussed scientific
uncertainty. The total number of cases shown in this graph represents 50 cases. One remaining
case of the 51 in our database had not been decided as of June 30th, 2020, which was the final date
for the decisions of the cases to be included in this research. 134
Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Mont. 2018), was decided before our cutoff date for
decided cases, but the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming in part and remanding in part the district court’s decision
was issued after that cutoff date. Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020). We therefore
coded the case as pending as of our June 30, 2020 cutoff date. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that
the FWS’s decision to delist the grizzly bear population in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem under the ESA was
arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to adequately analyze the effect of delisting on the remnant
grizzly population and acted contrary to the best available science in determining that the Yellowstone grizzly was
no longer threatened in the long term by a lack of genetic diversity. Id. at 677-80.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Bernhardt, No. 1:05-cv-02107 LJO-EPG, 2020 WL 364098 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22,
2020), was a case in which ENGOs alleged that long-term priority water contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation
violated § 9 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538, which prohibits the taking of listed species. The decision, which was
issued after our cutoff date, involved disposition of motions to stay and dismiss that did not end the litigation.
134

24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917907

Draft – 9/5/2021
To be published at 46 Harvard Envtl. L. Rev., Issue # 2 (2022)
Graph 1. Cases Decided by Year
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*The total number of lawsuits here is 50. One was undecided as of June 30th, 2020.

Our next question was what kinds of environmental problems triggered judicial discussion
of scientific uncertainty in climate cases. Among the climate change lawsuits in which the judges
engaged in a discussion about scientific uncertainty, biodiversity and air pollution were the two
environmental impacts linked to climate change that the courts discussed most frequently, as
Graph 2 depicts. Most of the biodiversity cases, not surprisingly, were among the 21 lawsuits filed
under ESA. The 30 NEPA cases included all five topics shown in Graph 2: air, water, biodiversity,
energy, and other. 135 The air pollution cases usually disputed the likelihood of a development
project (e.g., industrial plants or factories) emitting harmful pollutants and causing damage to the
environment, especially with regard to cumulative effects on and from climate change. The
biodiversity topics revolved around federal actions that were likely to affect endangered species
and/or their habitats based on climate change trajectory models that forecast the future well-being
of those species.

“Other” covered topics that do not fit squarely into the other four topics. These are mostly multi-topical lawsuits
that dispute various environmental impacts without necessarily pinpointing one as the primary issue. For example,
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 2:14-cv-00226 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017), involved issues
concerning air, water, and biodiversity (in terms of species habitat) without plaintiffs having focused on any one
particular primary topic.

135
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Graph 2. Primary Topics
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Finally, as Section B below indicates, we were interested in the degree of deference (if any)
which the courts afforded to the defendant agencies on the agencies’ determinations involving
scientific uncertainty. As Graph 3 indicates, the courts elected not to defer to the agency regarding
scientific uncertainty and ruled against the agency in 18 cases. In the other 27 cases, the courts
decided that the agencies were entitled to deference in disposing of challenges to agency action.
There were six cases in which the courts deferred to an agency’s scientific reasoning on some
claims but not on others. 136 Section B explores the reasons why the courts deferred to agency
responses to scientific uncertainty in some cases but not others.

For example, in Oceana v. Pritzker, 75 F. Supp. 3d 469 (D.D.C. 2014), the court decided that the NMFS
sufficiently considered the potential climate change impact on loggerhead turtles of operation of the Atlantic Sea
Scallop Fishery in a biological opinion (BiOp) it prepared under the ESA, despite the uncertainties surrounding
these topics. Id. at 491-93. The court refused to defer, however, to the agency’s selection of a monitoring surrogate
to serve as a proxy for the numerical take limit specified in an ITS that accompanied the BiOp or to the agency’s
perception of the effectiveness of its chosen monitoring mechanism. Id. at 494-99. On remand, the court again
deferred to part but not all of the NMFS’s analysis of its revised BiOp. See Oceana, Inc v. Ross, 321 F. Supp.3d 128
(D.D.C. 2018).
136
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Graph 3. Deference
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B. Qualitative Textual Analysis of Judicial Treatment of Scientific Uncertainty
As Section A reveals, the courts afforded deference to the manner in which agencies
addressed scientific uncertainty in some NEPA and ESA cases, but not others. Our principal aim
in conducting this study was to determine what accounts for judicial willingness (or unwillingness)
to defer to agencies on questions for which, by definition, there is no clear answer but for which,
generally, agencies tend to have more expertise than federal judges. This section identifies factors
that may explain when courts are likely to defer to agency resolution of questions on which climate
science is unsettled.
1. The Applicability and Significance of the Standard of Review
The degree of deference (if any) that courts afford administrative agency determinations
depends on several factors. One variable is the nature of the legal issue presented to the court. The
courts may address review of questions of fact, law, and policy differently. The federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), for example, mandates the application of different standards
of review for agency determinations on questions of fact, 137 law, 138 and policy. 139 Another
potentially relevant factor is the procedure the agency used in reaching its decision. Under the
APA, judicial review of factual determinations reached in formal rulemaking or adjudication is

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B) (2020).
Id. § 706(2)(C) (governing judicial review of agency statutory interpretations).
139
Id. § 706(2)(A) (requiring application of the arbitrary and capricious test). See also ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN &
RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 189 (3rd ed. 2020) (stating that
courts strike the balance between giving agencies the discretion needed to implement statutory mandates and
protecting the rights of parties and preserving the rule of law “depending on whether the question for review is one
of fact, law, or policy”).
137
138

27

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917907

Draft – 9/5/2021
To be published at 46 Harvard Envtl. L. Rev., Issue # 2 (2022)
subject to review under the substantial evidence test, 140 while the arbitrary and capricious test
applies to factual determinations reached in informal rulemaking or adjudication. 141 In addition,
the willingness of courts to defer to challenged agency determinations may turn on “factors such
as the relative expertise of the agency and the courts, the agency’s familiarity with the record, and
the extent to which review may interfere with agency operations or be necessary to protect the
rights of parties.” 142
The choice of the standard of review matters. As one of us has put it, “[a]t bottom, the
scope and standard of review determine the allocation of power among Congress, agencies, and
the courts. Deference to agencies allows them to control policy choices, while aggressive review
means that courts control policy choices.” 143 Review of agency factual determinations tends to be
relatively deferential because Congress has delegated fact-finding responsibility to the agency
whose decision is being reviewed, the agency has (comparatively greater) expertise in the field,
and the agency is more familiar with the record. 144
The standard of review that applied to most of the determinations relating to scientific
uncertainty in the cases in our database was the arbitrary and capricious standard. Because NEPA
does not include a provision authorizing judicial review, NEPA challenges must be brought based
on a cause of action derived from the APA. 145 The ESA includes a citizen suit provision but, with
limited exceptions, 146 it only authorizes suits against the FWS or the NMFS in which the plaintiff
alleges a failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the statutory listing provisions. 147 Thus,
many ESA cases are also brought under the APA, which thus governs judicial review of agency
actions under both statutes. 148 In any event, because the ESA’s citizen suit provision does not
enunciate its own standard or review, “[i]rrespective of whether an ESA claim is brought under
the APA or the citizen-suit provision, the APA’s ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard applies. . .

Id. § 706(2)(B); GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 139, at 246.
GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 139, at 247.
142
Id. at 189.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 222.
145
Wild Virginia v. Council on Env’t Quality, No. 3:20CV00045, 2021 WL 2521561, at *5 (W.D. Va. June 21,
2021). Section 702 of the APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA also provides that “final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” Id. § 704. These provisions create a cause of action for
review of final agency action. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) (stating that “[t]he
APA confers a general cause of action upon persons ‘adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute,’ 5 U.S.C. § 702”).
146
See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(B) (authorizing suits to compel the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture to apply the
statutory prohibitions on taking endangered or threatened species in the event of an emergency that poses a
significant risk to the well-being of a listed species).
147
Id. § 1540(g)(1(C).
148
Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Judicial review of
administrative decisions involving the ESA is governed by section 706 of the APA.”); cf. WildEarth Guardians v.
Steele, No. CV 19-56-M-DWM, 2021 WL 2590143, at *4 (D. Mont. June 24, 2021) (“The Administrative
Procedures [sic] Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706 et seq., governs judicial review of agency actions under NEPA and
the ESA.”).
140
141
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.” 149 Neither NEPA nor the ESA requires formal rulemaking or adjudication. 150 The
determinations at issue in the portions of the cases in which we were interested were either factual
determinations concerning the scientific evidence before the court or policy determinations
concerning how the agency should proceed in the face of scientific uncertainty. Both kinds of
determinations are subject to arbitrary and capricious review under the APA. 151 Thus, the courts
in the cases we analyzed, in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, had to choose the
degree of deference that was appropriate in the circled portion of Figure 3, ranging from deference
to no deference.
Figure 3. Spectrum of Deference

Source: GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 139, at 222. 152

Within that range, a court could determine that the agency’s determinations were entitled
to deference or that they were not entitled to deference, and therefore reflected arbitrary and
capricious decisionmaking (as reflected in the right side of Figure 2). Deferential review would
tend to be characterized by a court’s disinclination to second-guess the agency’s approach to
factual or policy matters where the science is uncertain, even if the party challenging the agency’s
decision took issue with that approach. 153 Non-deferential review would tend to reflect judicial

W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 481 (9th Cir. 2011).
The one context in which formal adjudication is required under the ESA is when the Endangered Species
Committee considers an application for an exemption from the ESA’s no jeopardy provision, 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2). See id. § 1536(g)(4) (requiring a hearing in accordance with the APA’s formal adjudication procedures,
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 555, and 556). None of the cases in our database involved such an exemption request.
151
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); ROBERT GLICKSMAN ET AL., STAY AHEAD OF THE PACK: YOUR COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO THE UPPER LEVEL CURRICULUM 33-34 (2018); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA LAW AND
LITIGATION 106 (2020 ed.) (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989)) (stating that
“judicial review of factual questions is carried out under the deferential ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of
review”).
152
The arrows and emphasized portion of the “most deference-least deference” line in Figure 1 have been added to
the figure from the original source.
153
See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 429 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1270 (D.N.M. 2019) (“A
‘careful, searching review’ in this case reveals highly technical determinations by scientists that, while may be
disputable in the eyes of [the plaintiff], earn deference in the eyes of the Court. . . .”).
149
150
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dissatisfaction with the agency’s failure to consider scientific uncertainty or inadequate
explanation of how it treated it. 154
2.

The Meaning of Arbitrary and Capricious Review

How does a court decide whether or not to defer to agency factual or policy determinations?
Several Supreme Court cases exploring the meaning and application of the arbitrary and capricious
test provide the starting points in answering that question. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe sent mixed signals in an early environmental case about the appropriate degree of
deference owed to agencies by courts applying the arbitrary and capricious test. 155 The key
question, the Court explained, is “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts
is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” 156 Notwithstanding the references to
the narrowness of review, Overton Park “is best known as the foundation stone for contemporary
‘hard look’ judicial review. . . . While the opinion ostensibly stressed the necessary limits of
judicial review [,] . . . it also indicated that within these ‘narrow’ limits review was to be ‘searching’
and ‘thorough,’ and the latter words are the ones that have tended to stick. The extensive nature of
the inquiry Overton Park outlined is what underlies the subsequent development of ‘hard look’
review.” 157
The Court carved out a category of cases in which particularly deferential review is called
for in the Baltimore Gas & Electric case decided a dozen years later. 158 That case involved a NEPA
challenge to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)’s approach to the licensing of nuclear
power plants. The issue before the agency was how to factor into the decisionmaking process the
environmental risks posed by the “back-end” of the fuel cycle, including the storage and disposal
of nuclear waste, whose nature and magnitude were uncertain. The NRC acknowledged that the
risks from long-term onsite storage pending the development of a safe method of permanent
disposal were uncertain, but it took the position that research would likely resolve most of those
uncertainties in the near future. 159 It issued a rule to govern the licensing process, concluding that
these risks would not be relevant to licensing determinations at all, and that it would not consider
them in NEPA analysis in subsequent individual licensing proceedings. 160 Further, the
Commission refused to allow licensing boards to further consider the uncertainties associated with

See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(stating that “we must reject any attempt by agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling any and
all discussion of future environmental effects as ‘crystal ball inquiry’”).
155
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
156
Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
157
Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting
the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1992).
158
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
159
Id. at 93.
160
Id. at 93-94; see also id. at 98 (“In its Table S–3 Rule here, the Commission has determined that the probabilities
favor the zero-release assumption, because the Nation is likely to develop methods to store the wastes with no
leakage to the environment.”).
154
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waste storage and disposal. 161 The Supreme Court deferred to the NRC’s approach and upheld the
rule. Explaining its deferential posture, the Court characterized the rule’s zero-risk assumption as
“a policy judgment” that was “within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking. It is not our task to
determine what decision we, as Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is to determine
whether the Commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.” 162 It added that “a reviewing court must remember
that the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of
fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.” 163
Emily Hammond has encapsulated the approach reflected in this case as “super deference,”
which “is supported by basic notions of institutional competence and plays into a natural judicial
tendency to avoid any deep confrontations with science.” 164 Given that Baltimore Gas & Electric
was a NEPA case, and that it involved judicial review of factual and policy determinations in the
context of scientific uncertainty, its relevance to the inquiry we addressed in our study is obvious.
The same year that the Court decided Baltimore Gas & Electric case, it issued another
decision that provided additional guidance to reviewing courts applying the arbitrary and
capricious test. In the State Farm case, 165 the Court reviewed the Reagan Administration’s
rescission of a rule adopted by the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) that required auto manufacturers to include in newly
manufactured vehicles either passive restraints or air bags. 166 A threshold question was whether
rescission of a rule should be subject to § 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious test or should instead
be judged by an even more deferential standard—the one a court would use in assessing an
agency’s refusal to issue a rule in the first place. 167 The Court concluded that the arbitrary and
capricious standard applies to rule rescissions. It reasoned that “the revocation of an extant
regulation is substantially different than a failure to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the
agency’s former views as to the proper course.” 168 In light of the policy reversal, “an agency
changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change
Id. at 94.
Id. at 105.
163
Id. at 103.
164
Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011). Hammond adds that supporters of super deference argue that
“if agency science is mostly about policy, and the politically accountable executive controls agencies, then agencies
are the more legitimate institution with respect to science.” Id. at 734-35. She takes issue with super deference,
however, asserting that:
Super deference is not grounded in realistic notions of agency science; it may contribute to ossification and
the science charade; and it appears to have a disparate impact on environmental law. Measured against
broader administrative-law values, super deference also inhibits transparency; undermines deliberation;
fails to accord with political accountability; and generally abdicates the courts’ role in the constitutional
scheme by encouraging outcome-oriented review. For these and many other reasons, I contend that super
deference has very little utility.
Id. at 737-38 (footnote omitted)
165
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
166
Id. at 38-39.
167
Id. at 40-41.
168
Id. at 41.
161
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beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” 169 Thus, the
Court signaled that inconsistency over time (in rulemaking and elsewhere) may call for application
of a relatively rigorous version of the arbitrary and capricious test. The Court would reinforce that
message in later cases. 170
The Court in State Farm then identified four situations that are indicative of arbitrary and
capricious agency decisionmaking:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has [1] relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, [2] entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, [3] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or [4] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt
itself to make up for such deficiencies. 171
The Court thus created a template for litigants seeking to challenge agency decisions as arbitrary
and capricious. The case qualifies as a “giant[ ] . . . of the modern administrative law canon,”172
which is “perhaps the best known case concerning judicial review of agencies policy choices”173
and reflects “a fairly intrusive review of agency decision making.” 174
Another piece of the standard of review puzzle for our purposes is reflected in a series of
decisions in which the Supreme Court has addressed the application of the arbitrary and capricious
test to agency flip-flops. As noted above, State Farm indicates that rescission of a rule may trigger
more searching review than a decision not to adopt a rule in the first place. 175 In the Fox Television
Stations case, 176 the Court provided more extended discussion of when, if ever, agency shifts in
position should trigger non-deferential review under the arbitrary and capricious test:
[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would
ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may
not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are
still on the books. And of course the agency must show that there are good reasons for the
new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the
new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is
Id. at 42.
See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
171
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (bracketed numbers added).
172
Richard Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the Duty to Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 817,
837 (2012).
173
Robert C. Dolehide, A Comparative “Hard Look” at Chevron: What the United Kingdom and Australia Reveal
About American Administrative Law, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (2010); cf. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1451 (2018) (calling State Farm “one of [the Court’s]
most significant arbitrary-and-capricious decisions”).
174
Dolehide, supra note 173, at 1388; see also John C. Reitz, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review, 66
AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 285 (2018) (“State Farm is an exhortation to the lower courts to make arbitrary-and-capricious
review meaningful by taking a hard look at how the agency has exercised its de jure discretion . . . .”).
175
See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
176
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
169
170
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permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes
it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that
the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice
for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new
policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or
when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into
account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not
that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
engendered by the prior policy. 177
The Court subsequently “underscore[d]” that “the APA requires an agency to provide more
substantial justification when ‘its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which
underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that
must be taken into account.’” 178 Thus, the Court indicated that courts should pay particular
attention to an agency’s explanation for a decision reversing one of its own prior determinations
or policies if the factual underpinnings of two inconsistent decisions are the same or if the initial
decision gave rise to reliance interests that may be disrupted by a change in position.
Finally, the Court provided a summary of governing principles for courts conducting
arbitrary and capricious review in Department of Commerce v. New York. 179 First among the
“settled propositions” that the Court identified is the requirement that an agency “disclose the
basis” of its action in order to permit meaningful judicial review. 180 Second, “a court is ordinarily
limited to evaluating the agency’s contemporaneous explanation in light of the existing
administrative record.” 181 Third, a court may not reject an agency’s stated reasons because it may
have had additional unstated reasons for its action. 182 Fourth, although courts generally may not
inquire into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers,” such an inquiry and extrarecord discovery may be called for upon a showing of bad faith or improper behavior. 183 In New
York, the Court remanded a decision by the Secretary of Commerce to add a question concerning
citizenship status to the census because “the evidence tells a story that does not match the
explanation the Secretary gave for his decision. [The Secretary’s] rationale—the sole stated
reason—seems to have been contrived.” 184 The Court connected this justification for its non-

177
Id. at 515-16. See also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016) (finding that the
Department of Labor’s explanation for altering its position on whether auto dealer service advisors are exempt from
statutory minimum wage and overtime requirements “fell short of the agency’s duty to explain why it deemed it
necessary to overrule its previous position”).
178
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 106 (2015).
179
Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
180
Id. at 2573.
181
Id. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def, Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978);
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973)).
182
Id.
183
Id. at 2573-74 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420).
184
Id. at 2575. See also id. (“We are presented, in other words, with an explanation for agency action that is
incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process.”).
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deferential review of the Secretary’s decision to one of the core requirements of non-arbitrary
agency action—reasoned decisionmaking, 185 stating that:
The reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure
that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be
scrutinized by courts and the interested public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat
the purpose of the enterprise. If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must
demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case. 186
The reference to “reasoned decisionmaking” was not new. The Court had previously declared that
“[f]ederal administrative agencies are required to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking,” 187 and
that the APA “establishes a scheme of ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’” 188 Likewise, scholars have
posited that “the requirement that administrative agencies provide adequate reasons for their
decisions has come to play a central role in judicial review of agency decisions.” 189
Amidst this welter of decisions describing the judicial function in conducting arbitrary and
capricious review, several points emerge that may be predictive of when courts will apply a
relatively more or less deferential version of the standard. The test is generally located toward the
deferential end of the standard of review spectrum reflected in Figure 1. Judicial review of agency
factual determinations tends to be deferential because of the agency’s comparatively greater
expertise and its familiarity with the administrative record. Courts are likely to be especially
deferential when agencies make predictive determinations concerning technical or scientific
matters. That point seems particularly salient in connection with judicial review of agency
judgments about how to approach scientific uncertainty.
But courts will not defer to agency explanations that run counter to the evidence before the
agency or are otherwise implausible. They will not defer to agency policy reversals if the agency
refuses to acknowledge its change of position or fails to explain why the change was appropriate
notwithstanding the absence of a change in the factual underpinning for the reversed decision, and
they may not defer if a change of position has significantly disrupted reliance interests. Courts will
not defer to agency decisions that are devoid of explanation (thereby thwarting the court’s ability
to carry out its assigned task of conducting arbitrary and capricious review) or that are supported
by explanations that conflict with the evidence (i.e., that lack a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made) or that appear contrived or pretextual. Deferential review will
not be appropriate if the agency relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider
The Court had held in State Farm that “the agency’s explanation for rescission of the passive restraint
requirement is not sufficient to enable us to conclude that the rescission was the product of reasoned
decisionmaking.” 463 U.S. at 52. Indeed, the lower court in State Farm had described reasoned decisionmaking as
“the essence of lawful administrative action.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 209
(D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In Baltimore Gas & Electric, on the other hand, the
Court found “the Commission’s zero-release assumption to be within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking
required by the APA.” 462 U.S. at 104.
186
New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
187
Michigan v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015).
188
Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998).
189
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 388 (1987)
185
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or entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem. Any of these defects is likely to
be regarded as indicative of a lack of reasoned decisionmaking which supports a determination of
arbitrary and capricious action.
3. Judicial Treatment of Agency Responses to Scientific Uncertainty Under NEPA
and the ESA: Our Qualitative Findings
Even though, under Baltimore Gas & Electric, deference is the default in reviewing
technical and scientific findings of fact, we found a significant number of cases (22) in which
courts refused to defer to agency treatment of scientific uncertainty, compared to 32 in which the
courts deferred to agency resolution of science-related questions. We were able to identify a series
of factors that prompted courts to afford deference to agency determinations in the face of scientific
uncertainty, and other factors that were indicative of arbitrariness justifying rejection of agency
reasoning even in the core areas of an agency’s technical expertise. We discuss these two clusters
of cases in the following two subsections. The cases discussed are illustrative of the courts’
deferential or non-deferential treatment of agency resolution of scientific uncertainty in the cases
in our database, rather than all-inclusive.
a. The Deference Cluster
The first cluster of cases that emerged from our cohort of cases included those in which
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard resulted in deference to an agency’s treatment
of scientific uncertainty in performing its NEPA or ESA responsibilities. Our analysis found 28
cases in which courts deferred to agencies regarding a scientific matter (as found in the quantitative
analysis shown in Graph 3). In rejecting attacks on the agency’s handling of scientific uncertainty,
the courts were unwilling to second-guess agency choices based on litigants’ criticisms alone,
without presenting more credible science. They also deferred when the agency’s scientific analysis
was thorough, with no obvious gaps in logic or overlooked and unaddressed problematic questions.
First, courts deferred to agencies when plaintiffs failed to identify more credible science
than that used by the agency despite the allegedly poor quality of agency science. 190 If the plaintiffs
could not provide any data that was arguably better than that used by the agency in order to
compete with the agency’s science, while at the same time suggesting that the agency’s process
was faulty because it failed to consider the best available science, the courts deferred to the
agency’s treatment of scientific uncertainty.
These cases suggest that a challenge brought under NEPA or the ESA attacking the science
used by the agency must proceed on two levels to have a reasonable chance of success. First, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the agency failed to use the best available science—such as by
showing a gap in the agency’s treatment of the available science. Second, it must provide
190
A previous study in which one of us participated, which covered all federal appellate cases in which the federal
Environmental Protection Agency appeared as a party that were decided between January 1, 1991 and August 1,
1999 found that “[a]ttacks based on the nature of the evidence upon which EPA relied in making its scientific
determinations were uniformly unsuccessful during the survey period.” Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L.
Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10371, 10398 (2001). Analogous challenges in the cases covered by this Article also fared poorly.
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additional information not relied on or rejected by the agency that does represent that the best
available science. The first part of this showing requires proof that the agency’s analysis of the
science was insufficient because, for example, it was outdated or flawed. In cases in which
plaintiffs argued that the methods or data used by an agency needed to be updated but failed to
further demonstrate how the science fell short of what was required by law, the agency prevailed.
Broadside attacks such as those alleging “analytical failings as a whole,” for example, did not
suffice to convince courts that deference was inappropriate. 191 Courts were not impressed when
litigants “call[ed] for more ‘analysis,’ but [did] not specify what they see as lacking or how
‘analysis’ could supply the want,” 192 or demanded further study without offering any reason “to
question the accuracy or adequacy of the study that was conducted.” 193
Moreover, even if the plaintiffs could pinpoint the allegedly inadequate scientific analysis
and explain why it was inadequate, that demonstration alone tended to be insufficient in scientific
uncertainty contexts to overcome judicial inclination to defer to agency expertise on factual or
policy matters. Instead, those challenging the agency’s use of science lost if they were unable to
show that the science they presented to the court was more credible than the information than that
which the agency relied so that the agency should have replaced its scientific information with the
litigants’ alternative science. 194
In one district court case, for example, ENGOs brought a suit challenging the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’ approval of a solar facility in an ecologically sensitive area that included the
habitat of several species listed under the ESA. 195 The plaintiffs claimed that the FWS violated the
ESA by failing to use the best available science in preparing its “no jeopardy” biological opinion
on the project and that the Corps improperly relied on that opinion in issuing a dredge and fill
permit for the project under the Clean Water Act. 196 They insisted that the FWS rejected, without
justification, the best available science and “instead relied on subpar data.” 197 The court disagreed.
The plaintiffs’ assertion that the FWS should have relied on a study prepared by the U.S.
Geological Survey failed because that study was preliminary and the study the FWS did rely on
was published and peer-reviewed. The court emphasized that “the determination of what
constitutes ‘the best scientific data available’ belongs to FWS’s ‘special expertise.’” 198 It
E.g., Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 697 F.3d 1010, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (unsuccessful NEPA challenge).
City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(unsuccessful NEPA challenge), overruled on other grounds, Florida Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 669
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
193
Id. at 490; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 969-71 (D. Alaska 2010)
(deferring to the FWS’s treatment of risks to ribbon seals by ocean acidification due to climate change). But cf. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding a NEPA
violation due to the BLM’s failure to collect data about the effects of fracking that was particular to the region
affected by oil and gas leases).
194
See, e.g., Alaska Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding designation of critical
habitat for polar bears); Idaho Rivers United v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. C14-1800JLR, 2016 WL 498911,
at *17 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2016) (deferring to the Corps on its treatment of uncertainty relating to the local impacts
of climate change in connection with proposed maintenance of the Snake River navigation channel).
195
Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., No. 16-CV-01993-LHK, 2016 WL 4382604 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2016).
196
Id. at *19.
197
Id.
198
Id. at *20 (quoting San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602 9th Cir. 2014)).
191
192
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concluded that “[p]laintiffs fail[ed] to present better scientific data on which FWS should have
relied in concluding that harmful habitat fragmentation would not occur.” 199 And it rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim that the FWS relied on outdated data and should have used species density data
from other studies. The FWS concluded that the study it relied on provided better site-specific
information and explained why it rejected the plaintiff’s preferred studies. The court repeated a
Ninth Circuit proposition that “[a]n agency complies with the best available science standard so
long as it does not ignore available studies, even if it disagrees with or discredits them.” 200 It
ultimately concluded that if the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court
is obliged to uphold the agency’s findings. 201
In other cases, plaintiffs challenged an agency’s choice of scientific approach (including
its forecast models and research methodology) rather than the accuracy or currency of, or decision
to rely on, particular studies. Here, too, the courts tended to apply the arbitrary and capricious test
deferentially. 202 For example, in one case, the plaintiffs brought an unsuccessful NEPA challenge
to block the BLM’s approval of a right-of-way across public lands for a utility-scale wind energy
facility. 203 The plaintiffs claimed that the BLM should have prepared a life-cycle assessment of
the project’s GHG emissions, and in particular that it should have considered emissions not only
from on-site construction and operation, but also from off-site equipment manufacture and
transportation. The court rejected the claim, reasoning that “BLM was not obligated to engage in
the ‘life-cycle’ assessment of GHG emissions that Plaintiffs demand. . . . BLM’s choice of
methodology in evaluating climate change impacts is grounded in legitimate concerns and is
therefore entitled to respect from the Court.” 204
Id. at *22.
Id. at *23 (quoting San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). See also
id. (quoting San Luis, 747 F.3d at 602) (“The determination of what constitutes the ‘best scientific data available’
belongs to FWS’s ‘special expertise.’ . . . When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to
simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”). The court also rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim that EPA failed to consider relevant factors (the impact of drought on the distribution of the giant
kangaroo rat population and the impact of kangaroo rat relocation on the San Joaquin kit fox). Id. at *23-24. Even
when the court regarded the plaintiffs’ concerns as “legitimate” in connection with the FWS’s alleged failure to
consider the impact of habitat loss caused by the project on the survival and recovery of the rat and fox, it refused to
substitute its judgment for the agency’s, concluding that the FWS had considered the relevant factors, and had not
committed a clear error of judgment. Id. at *24-25. See also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp.
2d 945, 961-62 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding that the FWS adequately considered differences in management of
ribbon seals by Russia and the United States).
201
Id. at *25.
202
See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 964-65, 966-67 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(deferring to FWS’s decision that climate models making projections beyond 2050 were unreliable). The courts have
refused to find arbitrary action on these grounds on environmental issues that did not involve climate change. See,
e.g., Hillsdale Env’t Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 702 F.3d 1156, 1178 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“Courts are not in a position to decide the propriety of competing methodologies . . . but instead, should determine
simply whether the challenged method had a rational basis and took into consideration the relevant factors… This is
particularly true when the dispute involves a technical judgment within the agency’s area of expertise.”).
203
Protect Our Communities Found. v. Jewell, No. 13CV575 JLS JMA, 2014 WL 1364453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
25, 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2016). See also Idaho Rivers United v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.
C14-1800JLR, 2016 WL 498911, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2016) (quoting Salmon River Concerned Citizens v.
Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1359 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“NEPA does not require that we decide whether an environmental
impact statement is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve
disagreements among various scientists as to methodology.”).
204
Protect Our Communities, 2014 WL at *18.
199
200
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In another case, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the FWS’s reliance in listing polar bears as a
threatened species under the ESA on U.S. Geological Survey models that projected the impacts of
climate change on polar bear populations, even though the agency conceded the models’
limitations. 205 It distinguished cases in which an agency failed to explain how model shortcomings
undercut the agency decisions: “FWS understood and explained the models’ limitations and
carefully explained why its limited reliance on the models was justified.” 206
The cases in the deference cluster indicate that courts are likely to defer to agency
resolution of scientific disputes in the context of climate-related uncertainty unless plaintiffs are
able to do more than identify alleged flaws in the agency’s interpretation of the science on which
it relied. 207 Plaintiffs’ chances of success are likely to increase if they are able to present science
that the court is convinced is stronger than what the agency relied upon. Challenges to agency
methodologies and models also fared poorly. This result should not be surprising, for, as one of us
has previously noted, “[s]ubstantive challenges to an agency’s use of modeling in environmental
decision making typically faces an uphill climb.” 208 That finding is significant given the ubiquity
of scientists’ (including agency scientists) reliance on models in conducting climate analysis.209
Litigants challenging agency modeling are likely to have the best chance of succeeding if they are
able to convince a court that the model used was mismatched to the scientific issue for which it is
being used. 210

In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig.—MDL No. 1993, 709 F.3d 1, 13
(D.C. Cir. 2013). See also San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 620 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“The fact that the FWS chose one flawed model over another flawed model is the kind of judgment to which we
must defer.”). See also Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 190, at 10401 (citing cases in which appellate courts
deferred to EPA’s use of “admittedly imperfect scientific or statistical models”).
206
In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 13-14.
207
See, e.g., League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, No. 3:12-CV02271-HZ, 2013 WL 3776305, at *14 (D. Or. July 17, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded on other
grounds, 752 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting claim that agency failed to adequately address impact of
commercial logging project on carbon sequestration and climate change, even though the agency recognized that “it
is not presently possible to determine the cumulative impact on global climate from emissions”); see also Desert
Survivors v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049-50 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding adequate
discussion by the FWS of cumulative effects of climate change and other species threats in refusing to list sage
grouse as threatened).
208
Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best
Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the National Forest Management Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465, 483
(2008). See also id. at 484 (footnotes omitted) (“The courts typically have not been impressed by claims that an
agency chose the wrong model from among competing alternative models, that deficiencies in the data the agency
plugged into the model invalidated the results, that the model did not accurately predict or was not capable of
actually predicting real world results, or that the agency should have deferred its decision until it could accumulate
more information instead of relying on modeling results.”).
209
See Edward B. Rastetter, Validating Models of Ecosystem Response to Global Change: How Can We Best Assess
Models of Long-Term Global Change?, 46 BIOSCIENCE 190, 196 (1996) (asserting that climate change models
“surpass any other method of projecting responses to changes in climate”); cf. Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate
Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1656–57 (2008) (“Given the complexities
of climate change, such models are especially important in making information accessible to policy makers and
members of the public.”).
210
See Glicksman, supra note 208, at 485 (“The courts have invalidated agency decisions that relied on modeling or
simulation exercises . . . in cases in which they have found that a particular model was ill-suited to the activities to
205
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b. The No Deference Cluster
The second cluster of cases that emerged from analysis included those in which application
of the arbitrary and capricious standard resulted in a lack of deference to an agency’s treatment of
scientific uncertainty in performing its NEPA or ESA responsibilities, notwithstanding Baltimore
Gas & Electric’s strong default principle of deference to agency resolution of technical questions
at the frontiers of scientific knowledge. 211 We found 18 cases in this cluster. 212 In most of these
cases, the courts identified flawed or otherwise inadequate reasoning in support of the agency’s
treatment of scientific uncertainty. These included cases in which courts concluded that the agency
provided an explanation that lacked clarity 213 or that was tainted by internal inconsistencies, 214
relied on unsupported assumptions, 215 and failed to explain why the agency ignored or discounted
scientific studies introduced into the record by litigants. 216 These flaws qualified as reasons for
deeming agency actions arbitrary based on an agency’s failure make a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made, consider an important aspect of the problem, or provide a
plausible explanation for its action. In some cases, the agency forfeited deference for more than
one of these reasons.
We divide these cases into four categories based on the nature of the defect the court
identified. We devote more attention to these cases than to the cases in the deference cluster
because of the expectation that courts will defer, not take issue with, agency scientific
determinations at the frontiers of knowledge. 217 The cases in this cluster are therefore more
which it applied or that the agency was unable to justify building the model on apparently arbitrary assumptions”);
Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 190, at 10406-07.
211
See supra note 163 and accompanying text (quoting Baltimore Gas & Electric).
212
If a court deferred on some issues but not others, we included the case in both the deference and no deference
clusters. That accounts for total of 57 cases (27+6) + (18+6)), even though our database comprised only 51 cases.
213
E.g., League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 761
(9th Cir. 2014) (inadequate justification for failing to prepare a supplemental EIS under NEPA).
214
See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1195 (D. Colo. 2014)
(faulting the USFS and the BLM for claiming that projecting GHG emissions from mining on public lands in
Colorado would be too complex, while using data on methane emissions from three mines for other purposes); id. at
1196 (same).
215
See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1234-38 (10th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that the BLM’s assumption that coal not extracted from federal lands would be available elsewhere at a
comparable price was arbitrary); Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 502-05 (9th Cir. 2014)
(selection of an arbitrarily low estimate of the number of barrels of recoverable oil in assessing environmental
impacts under NEPA of proposed leasing of oil and gas on public lands in Alaska); Permian Basin Petroleum Ass’n
v. Dep’t of the Interior, 127 F. Supp. 3d 700, 720 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (improper reliance in listing the lesser prairie
chicken under the ESA on critical assumption that plan to create additional habitat and access to it did not address
the primary threat of drought and climate change); High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F.
Supp. 3d 1174, 1197-98 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding it arbitrary for agencies to rely on unsupported assumptions that
future GHG emission technologies will be adopted and that if coal were not mined on public lands in Colorado,
consumers would “pay to have the same amount of coal pulled out of the ground somewhere else,” so that overall
“emissions from coal combustion would be identical in either scenario”).
216
See, e.g., Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke, 289 F. Supp. 103, 109-11 (D.D.C. 2018).
217
See supra notes 158-63 (describing Baltimore Gas & Electric). See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing Baltimore Gas & Elec. by concluding that
although climate science will improve in the future, “it is not a scientific frontier as defined by the Supreme Court in
Baltimore Gas, i.e., as barely emergent knowledge and technology”).
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surprising than those in the deference cluster and are perhaps more revealing in predicting judicial
receptions to those determinations.
(1) Irrational Reasoning
In some of the cases in the non-deference cluster, the courts declared agency actions to be
arbitrary and capricious based on the overarching conclusion that an agency’s treatment of
scientific uncertainty reflected a failure to make a rational connection between the evidence in the
record before it and the action it took. That flaw signified faulty reasoning. In one such case, the
Ninth Circuit vacated the FWS’s decision to delist the Yellowstone grizzly bear as a threatened
species under the ESA. 218 The FWS based the delisting on its finding that a decline in whitebark
pine production as a result of climate change was not likely to impact the species to the point where
it was likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future. The court determined, however, that
“it cannot reasonably be denied” that the loss of whitebark pines, which are an important food
source for Yellowstone grizzlies, “presents at least a potential threat to the Yellowstone grizzly
population.” 219 The FWS protested that it simply did not know yet what the impact of whitebark
pine loss would have on the species. The court “recognize[d] that scientific uncertainty generally
calls for deference to agency expertise.” 220 In this case, however, the FWS “did not articulate a
rational connection between the data before it and its conclusion that whitebark pine declines were
not likely to threaten the Yellowstone grizzly bear.” 221
(2) Incomplete Analysis
In other cases, the courts refused to defer to agency treatment of science if agencies failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem before them. In one case, for example, a district
court vacated a FWS rule for evaluating conservation efforts when making listing decisions under
the ESA because the FWS failed to consider factors such as prior industry and landowner
participation in other conservation efforts in the area or to project future funding, relying on a
purported “high level of uncertainty” as a justification for its failure. 222 In another case, a district
court found the BLM’s failure to consider the downstream impacts on climate change of GHG
emissions resulting from the consumption of oil and gas to be produced by oil and gas lease sales
on federal lands to be arbitrary and capricious. 223
(3) Evidentiary Shortcomings

Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1024.
220
Id. at 1028.
221
Id. at 1030.
222
Permian Basin Petroleum Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 127 F. Supp. 3d 700, 714-15 (W.D. Tex. 2015). See also
id. at 716-17 (failure to consider land enrolled by industry participants who might agree to restrict activity
detrimental to the lesser prairie chicken).
223
San Juan Citizens Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1242-44 (D.N.M. 2018). But cf.
Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
19, 2019) (holding that FERC adequately considered climate impacts of downstream GHG emissions from
combustion of natural gas that would be transported by proposed pipeline).
218
219
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The departure point for arbitrary and capricious review is a high degree of judicial
deference to agency technical determinations, especially on issues implicating scientific
uncertainty. Yet, in a significant number of cases in our cohort, courts concluded that the agency’s
explanation ran counter to the evidence before it. For example, in one case, a district court
remanded to the FWS its exclusion of Colorado from its designation of critical habitat for the
Canada lynx. The FWS’s failure to acknowledge that lynx reproduction likely signaled the
presence of primary constituent elements in at least some parts of the state was not supported by
the evidence. 224 In another case, the Ninth Circuit remanded corporate average fuel economy
standards adopted by NHTSA because its finding of no significant impact was based on a
conclusory assertion, which was contradicted by evidence in the record, that the standards would
only result in a small increase in carbon emissions. 225 The court found that NHTSA provided no
analysis or data to support its assertion. 226
Relatedly, agencies were unable to take advantage of the deference normally due to their
scientific determinations if they ignored evidence. In High Country Advocates v. U.S. Forest
Service, 227 the court refused to accept the contention of the USFS and the BLM that it was
impossible to disclose the foreseeable indirect effects on GHG gas emissions that would result
from expanded mining operations on public lands. The court pointed out that the social cost of
carbon protocol was available to quantify a project’s contribution to costs associated with climate
change. 228 The agencies’ EIS, “on its face, offers a factually inaccurate justification for why it
omitted the social cost of carbon protocol. A tool existed, and indeed it was in the draft EIS. This
justification ‘runs counter to the evidence before the agency [and] is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. . . .’” 229 The court noted
that the agencies “might have been able to offer non-arbitrary reasons why the protocol should not
have been included in the EIS. They did not.” 230 In addition, courts in some cases took issue with
agency explanations that litigants showed were based on obsolete information. 231
In rare cases, the courts have even been willing to take issue with an agency’s interpretation
of scientific studies bearing on climate change and its impacts. In one case, a district court held
that the FWS failed to make a reasoned determination when it removed Greater Yellowstone
Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1183-86 (D. Mont. 2016). See also
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that the BLM
“provided no information” to support its analysis of the climate impacts of coal production on public lands).
225
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1220 (9th Cir. 2008).
226
Id. at 1223; see also id. (finding that NHTSA made “vague and conclusory statements” that were unaccompanied
by supporting data); San Juan Citizens Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1242-48
(D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting as inadequate the BLM’s “facile conclusion” that cumulative effects on climate oil and gas
lease sales on public lands would be minor).
227
High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014).
228
Id. at 1190.
229
Id. at 1191 (quoting New Mex. ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 704 (10th Cir. 2009)).
Compare EarthReports, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 828 F.3d 949, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (deferring
to FERC’s refusal to use the social cost of carbon to analyze impacts of GHG emissions resulting from its approval
of a natural gas export terminal); see also Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 17-1271,
2019 WL 847199, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2019).
230
High Country, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1191-92. The court also concluded that the agencies acted arbitrarily by failing
to address or acknowledge an expert report on forecasting emissions submitted by the plaintiffs. Id. at 1198.
231
See, e.g., Permian Basin Petroleum Ass’n v. Dep't of the Interior, 127 F. Supp. 3d 700, 716 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
224
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grizzly bears from the list of threatened species under the ESA. 232 The court’s starting point was
the impropriety of allowing litigants to substitute their interpretation of the scientific data for the
agency’s. 233 The tribal plaintiffs argued that although the FWS relied on the best science in making
its delisting decision, it did not interpret that science rationally. The court remarked that the APA
sets “a high bar” for prevailing on such arguments, but that the tribes had cleared it. 234 In a previous
conservation strategy, the FWS had committed to translocating grizzlies from another population
into the Yellowstone area to contribute to genetic diversity, but it abandoned that commitment in
deciding to delist the bears. Instead, it explained that genetic diversity was no longer a concern
because a sufficiently large population already inhabited the area. The court concluded that the
FWS “illogically cobbled together two studies” in the record to support its conclusion that
adequate genetic diversity already existed. 235 In addition, the agency “ignored the clear concerns
expressed by the studies’ authors about long-term viability of an isolated grizzly population; one
of the studies had recommended measures to ensure cross-breeding between bear populations in
two ecosystems, especially in light of the unpredictability of future climate and habitat changes. 236
In short, “the studies cited by the Service do not squarely support the assertions for which they are
cited.” 237 The court found the delisting to be arbitrary and capricious because it was “both illogical
and inconsistent with the cautious approach demanded by the ESA.” 238
(4) Reverse-Engineered Science
In at least one case, a court based its determination that agency action was arbitrary on its
conclusion that the agency reached its desired result and then manipulated its reading of the science
to support that result. 239 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 240 the FWS responded to a petition filed
with it under the ESA by issuing a proposed rule to list the North American wolverine as a
threatened species. In doing so, it relied heavily on two studies of the projected impacts of climate
change on the species. Both studies, which at the time of the proposal the FWS characterized as
the best available science, projected range losses for the wolverine as a result of shrinking spring
snow cover projected by multiple global climate models. 241 The proposed rule found that a distinct
population segment (DPS) of the wolverine met the definition of a threatened species due to the
likelihood of habitat loss caused by climate change, which would in turn result in population
declines “leading to breakdown of metapopulation dynamics.” 242 Within weeks of its proposed
listing, the FWS drafted recovery and translocation plans. 243
Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1021 (D. Mont. 2018), aff’d in part, remanded in part,
965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020).
233
Id. at 1019.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 1020.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 1021. The 9th Circuit, in a decision issued after the close of our survey period, affirmed on this issue. Crow
Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d 662, 678-80 (9th 2020).
239
Cf. Kunaknana v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1092-93 (D. Alaska 2014) (faulting the
Corps for its post hoc rationalization for failing to prepare a supplemental EIS).
240
Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975 (D. Mont. 2016).
241
Id. at 982-85.
242
Id. at 985.
243
Id. at 986.
232
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The FWS received a flood of comments on its proposal, including negative comments from
some of the western states in which the wolverine is found. 244 A year and a half after issuing its
initial proposal, the FWS withdrew the proposed listing rule, determining “that based on new
information and further analysis of the existing and new data, factors affecting the DPS cited in
the proposed listing rule do not place the wolverine in danger of extinction now or likely to become
so in the foreseeable future.” 245 It now took the position that it lacked “sufficient information to
understand the response of wolverines to future changes in climate.” 246
The court phrased the issue in the challenge to the withdrawal initiated by ENGOs
simply—why? Why did the FWS first propose to list the wolverine based on what it regarded as
the best available science and then change its mind? 247 The court identified a possible answer—
“the immense political pressure that was brought to bear on the issue, particularly by a handful of
western states.” 248 But the court put these suspicions aside, concentrating on the agency’s
treatment of climate science. In explaining its withdrawal, the FWS discounted the studies it had
previously relied on by arguing that it was unable to reliably downscale the studies’ findings to the
habitat of this DPS of the wolverine. The court discerned two “fatal flaws” in the agency’s analysis
of one of the studies. First, it discounted the study based on the unpublished, unreviewed, personal
opinion “elicited by [the Regional Director] in the eleventh hour to back fill her foregone
conclusion to withdraw the Proposed Rule.” 249 Further, none of the state comments urging the
FWS to ignore the study provided any scientific evidence to rebuff the study’s conclusions. 250
These and other related reasons for rejecting the initial study’s findings provided an explanation
that was counter to the evidence in the record. 251 Second, the FWS discredited the initial study on
the ground that it failed to analyze projected precipitation trends at a finer scale, even though it
conceded that no other study had provided that kind of analysis for the wolverine. The ESA
requires the FWS to base its listing determinations on the best scientific data available and “accepts
agency decisions in the face of uncertainty.” 252 The agency could not reject the study simply
because it did not provide evidence that was better than the best available science. 253 The court
remanded to the FWS to reconsider its conclusions concerning the effects of climate change on
wolverine denning habitat. 254
4.

Lessons from the Scientific Uncertainty Cases

Id. at 986-89.
Id. at 995.
246
Id. at 996.
247
Id. at 1000.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 1002; see also id. (noting that the timing of the critical personal comments “gives them a sort of ‘shoot first
ask questions later’ feel).
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 1003.
253
The court rejected the FWS’s reasons for discounting the second study it had relied on in issuing the proposed
listing rule for similar reasons, finding that it misunderstood the purpose of the study and erroneously demanded
conclusiveness in order to credit scientific evidence. Id. at 1003-05 (concerning the causal relationship between
snow and denning).
254
Id. at 1001.
244
245
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Courts have traditionally been reluctant to wade too deeply into evaluation of the relative
merits of competing interpretations of scientific evidence lest they find themselves weighing in on
matters on which their lack of expertise risks producing uninformed judgments. 255 That reluctance
is magnified when one of the contesting parties is an administrative agency whose mandate
includes making factual and policy determinations based on its evaluation of the science before
it. 256 Statutory decrees that agencies make decisions based on the “best available” science, like
those in the ESA’s listing and no jeopardy provisions, are likely to push courts still further toward
deferential review. Such decrees reflect a judgment by Congress that agency determinations should
pass judicial muster even if they fall short of conclusiveness or perfection, which in contexts such
as assessments of the impacts of climate change, may be impossible to achieve. 257 Finally, when
the scientific issues being decided arise in the context of uncertainty, which surely characterizes
significant aspects of climate science, one might expect the highest likelihood of deference. In
such cases, courts may feel particularly uncomfortable second-guessing agencies on issues for
which there are no definitive answers.
It is therefore not surprising that in a majority of the cases in our database, the courts
reviewing agency scientific determinations in cases involving uncertainties relating to the impacts
on the environment and on agency projects of climate change deferred to those determinations.
These cases suggest that litigants challenging agency scientific factual findings or related policy
judgments in this context generally are unlikely to prevail if they cannot identify more credible
science than the agency’s science, even if the agency’s science is admittedly imperfect. To put
themselves in the best position of prevailing, litigants should seek to present information that does
not replicate the flaws in the agency’s science, such that the agency should have replaced its
scientific information with the litigants’ alternative science or at least considered that information
in addition to its own favored science. Litigants also start at a significant disadvantage when they
challenge an agency’s choice of scientific approach, such as its choice of climate models or other
research methodology. The prospects of success in these challenges are likely to increase if
litigants can demonstrate that agency modeling was mismatched to the scientific issue for which
it was relied upon. In most if not all of the cases in our deference cluster, the courts did not delve
too deeply into an evaluation of the merits of the agency’s treatment of science. In a sense,
deference substituted for deliberation.
See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (warning against “embroil[ing] the courts in ongoing scientific
controversies beyond their expertise”); Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use
and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 219, 220
(2002) (“Until scientists and attorneys work together to educate triers of fact to develop protocols for general
acceptance, courts will be reluctant to work through the associated complex science and mathematics necessary to
assign evidentiary value to the information.”).
256
See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 174, at 272 (“With respect to technical and scientific matters, courts may or may not
see the agency as having greater expertise than the challenging parties, but they most likely see the agencies as
having greater expertise, or at least access to greater expertise, than the courts, and they may therefore be especially
reluctant to second-guess the agency's decisions on these grounds.”); Scott D. Deatherage, Scientific Uncertainty in
Regulating Deliberate Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Substantive Judicial Review and Institutional
Alternatives, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 224 (1987) (footnote omitted) (“Courts are reluctant to scrutinize
agency decisions involving complex and uncertain science because judges often lack formal training in science and
risk assessment and have only little familiarity with computer or mathematical modeling.”).
257
See, e.g., Alaska Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 555 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that the best available
science mandate in the ESA’s listing and critical habitat designations “requires use of the best available technology,
not perfection”).
255
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Notwithstanding the impetus for courts to defer to agency treatment of science in contexts
of uncertainty, parties challenging agency scientific determinations prevailed in a considerable
number of the cases in our database. A review of these cases allowed us to identify agency practices
them make them vulnerable to reversal and that may make courts feel competent to single out as
justifications for intervening in what otherwise might be foreign territory to them.
The overarching rubric invoked by the courts that took issue with agency treatment of
science in contexts of uncertainty was a determination of inadequate reasoning, which is the
essence of arbitrary and capricious review. 258 Our database includes cases in which courts found
lack of clarity in agency explanations, internal inconsistencies, unsupported assumptions, and
unjustified discounting of record evidence that seemed both relevant and reliable. Further, we
identified four forms of arbitrary and capricious reasoning that are likely to pose a risk of thwarting
agency science-based initiatives. These included irrationality in agency reasoning, incomplete
analysis, evidentiary shortcomings, and “motivated,” pretextual, or manipulated reasoning. 259
These practices provided red flags that induced courts to give more than a “soft glance” to
the agency’s determination and to reject rote acceptance of the agency’s pleas for deference to its
expert judgment. 260 In these cases, the courts were willing to play a more proactive role in
evaluating the science and even to act as the arbiter of competing conceptions of the available
science. The rulings in our non-deference cluster may reflect the judges’ perception that the
agencies were shirking their responsibilities by characterizing future environmental effects as
uncertain rather than doing the hard work of evaluating evidence that did not correspond to the
information the agency preferred to use in reaching its desired result. 261
V. Conclusion
Scientific issues are often at the heart of environmental litigation, including litigation under
NEPA and the ESA. 262 A nuanced understanding of the technical evidence presented in those cases
may require expertise that the judges called on to resolve the legal issues that turn on scientific
knowledge do not possess. 263 As the Supreme Court noted in addressing the requirements for the
See supra § IVB.2.
See David Schraub, Deliberation and Dismissal, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1319, 1338 (2020) (describing
“[e]valuative motivated reasoning” as based on “a biased appraisal of evidence”).
260
See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1407
(2010) (describing “soft glance” judicial review as considerably deferential).
261
See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975 (D. Mont. 2016) (discussed supra at notes 240-54
and accompanying text).
262
See Stephen E. Snyder, Daniel Luecke & John E. Thorson, Adversarial Collaboration: Court-Mandated
Collaboration Between Opposing Scientific Experts in Colorado’s Water Courts, 28-Sum. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 8, 8 (2013) (“Natural resource and environmental litigation almost universally involves conflicting scientific
claims.”); Frank Tuerkheimer, The Daubert Case and Its Aftermath: A Shot-Gun Wedding of Technology and Law in
the Supreme Court, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 829 (2001) (“Environmental litigation almost invariably involves
science . . . .”).
263
See Palila (Psittirostra bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 512 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (D. Haw. 1981)
(“Complex environmental litigation such as this case requires skills and specialization beyond that possessed by
most attorneys in general practice.”).
258
259
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introduction of scientific expert testimony in the Daubert case, “[t]he adjective ‘scientific’ implies
a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.” 264 Judges typically lack such grounding.
For understandable reasons, judges may be reluctant to stray outside the bounds of their
comfort zones by choosing sides when presented with conflicting scientific interpretations. When
one of the parties in litigation implicating scientific issues is a federal agency, the agency begins
with a decided advantage. Agencies hire experts in scientific fields relevant to an understanding
of the environmental implications of their decisions. 265 In addition, Congress delegates factfinding and other decisionmaking responsibilities to the agencies, not the courts. Finally, statutory
standards of judicial review, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, dictate a deferential posture of
judicial review when implementation of those responsibilities is challenged.
Although judges may not be steeped in scientific expertise, they “are trained lawyers who
have been socialized to look at problems with a focus on logic and analysis.” 266 The focus of
arbitrary and capricious review on whether an agency has supplied adequate reasons for its
decision therefore allows judges to review agency decisions by using the tools with which they
have been trained. Review of agency reasoning “reminds judges that they are not to substitute their
judgment for the policy choices of an agency.” 267 As Judge Harold Leventhal advocated, however,
substantive review of agency reasoning to determine whether an agency has “conform[ed] to
statutory standards and requirements of rationality” requires judges to “act with restraint. Restraint,
yes, abdication, no.” 268
Of the 51 cases in our study that involved scientific uncertainty over the effects of climate
change decided by the federal courts over a span of thirty years, the majority reflected deference
to agency treatment of conflicting interpretations of science in decisionmaking under NEPA and
the ESA. In these cases, the courts for the most part did not engage in extensive review of the
science, choosing instead to accept the agencies’ reasons for resolving scientific issues, even if
(especially if) the agency conceded that the science was unsettled.
In a significant number of cases, however, litigants were able to convince courts that
agencies did not provide adequate reasons in support of their treatment of scientific uncertainty.
Lack of clarity, internal inconsistencies, unsupported assumptions, and failure to credit seemingly
reliable record evidence, and reasoning that seemed concocted to support a preordained result all
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1811, 1862 (2012) (“Agencies hire experts to study and corroborate their policy decisions, staff to review and
respond to comments, economists to evaluate the costs and benefits of different policies, and lawyers to draft
preambles explaining the reasons for policy decisions and to defend agency actions.”).
Cf. Ellen L. Weintraub & Carlos A. Valdivia, Strike and Share: Combatting Foreign Influence Campaigns on Social
Media, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 701, 720 (2020) (“Having in-house experts within federal agencies can mean the
difference between sensible, impactful policy solutions and doomed-to-fail regulation.”).
266
Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 984 (2011); see also C.J. Williams, Advocating Altering Advocacy Academics: A Proposal to
Change the Pedagogical Approach to Legal Advocacy, 25 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 203, 228 (2020)
(stating that “judges are legally trained and mentally disciplined to make dispassionate decisions based on reason
and logic”).
267
Shapiro & Levy, supra note 189, at 437.
268
Ethyl Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal. J., concurring).
264
265
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signaled problematic reasoning that demanded a better explanation from the agency. In some of
these cases, the flaws were so glaring that the courts were willing to take a deeper dive into the
scientific evidence than one might expect in cases that turn on highly specialized knowledge. When
agency reasoning seemed patently deficient, deference gave way to relatively rigorous scrutiny.
The cases we analyzed represent a small slice of cases that implicate scientific uncertainty.
They arise under only two statutes, NEPA and the ESA. The CEQ regulations adopted under
NEPA includes a provision specifically directed to agency treatment of scientific uncertainty.269
More than a dozen states have adopted their own versions of NEPA. 270 It would be illuminating to
see if state courts have afforded more or less deference to state agencies under those laws than the
federal courts in the cases we surveyed did on issues of scientific uncertainty.
The ESA requires agencies, including, the FWS and the NMFS to premise their judgments
on the best available science. 271 A host of other federal environmental statutes also require
agencies to root their decisions in the best available science. 272 Further research would be helpful
in determining whether the resolution of claims concerning scientific uncertainty relating to
climate change reflects the same pattern of results that we found in the NEPA and ESA cases. 273
Future research projects might also track how the courts address agency treatment of
scientific uncertainty over time. Advances in climate science, such as the development of
attribution science, 274 may narrow the range of issues for which the science is uncertain. Even in
areas with persistent uncertainty, agency methods of managing and responding to it (such as the
use of predictive computer modeling) may develop. Courts may shift the ways in which they
review agency judgments in contexts of uncertainty, either in response to changes in principles
governing standards of review driven by the Supreme Court or the appellate courts, or as a body
of precedent builds up that more clearly sets the parameters of judicial review in climate cases.
Finally, litigant may change the manner in which they pitch their challenges to agency treatment
of scientific uncertainty in climate cases in response to past failures and successes. All of these
potential developments bear watching as courts continue to strike the balance between deferential
review and insistence that agencies provide adequate reasons for their actions.

40 C.F.R. § 1502.21.
See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 151, at § 12:2.
271
16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), 1536(a)(2), (c)(1), (h)(2)(B)(i).
272
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1362(19)(B), 1371(a)(3)(A), 1373(a), 1374(c)(5)(C)(ii), 1378(a)(2)(B), 1386(a) (2020)
(Marine Mammal Protection Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1645(d)(1) (2020) (National Forest Management Act); 16 U.S.C. §§
1851(a)(2), 1853(b)(2)(C)(i), 1865(a) (2020) (fishery conservation and management); 16 U.S.C. § 3638(a) (2020)
(Pacific salmon fishing); 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591b(b)(1)(B), 6951d(b)(1)(B), 6951e(1)(A)(vii)(II) (2020) (Healthy Forests
Restoration Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(27) (2020) (oil spills); 33 U.S.C. § 2102 (2020) (artificial reef protection); 42
U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2020) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 10363(b)(1) (2020) (reclamation
climate change and water program,).
273
See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1221 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ecology Ctr. v.
Castaneda, 774 F.3d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 2009)) (rejecting claim that the Forest Service violated the USFS’s regulatory
obligation to use the best available scientific information in the forest planning process because “[a] party
challenging the Forest Service’s scientific analysis cannot simply ‘cite studies that support a conclusion different
from the one the Forest Service reached’ and must instead provide ‘“scientific studies that indicate the Forest
Service's analysis is outdated or flawed’”).
274
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
269
270
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Appendix 1
Cases in Our Database

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell
Nos. 3:11-cv-0025-RRB, 3:11-cv-0036-RRB, 3:11-cv-0106-RRB, 2013 WL 11897792 (D. Alaska May
15, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 815 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 2016
Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
No. 4:14-cv-00029-RRB, Case No. 4:15-cv-00002-RRB, Case No. 4:15-cv-00005-RRB, 2016 WL
1125744 (D. Alaska Mar. 17, 2016)
Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker
840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016)
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Pena
No. 2:16-CV-294-RMP, 2016 WL 6123236 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2016), aff’d, 865 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
2017)
Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Brazell
No. 3:12–cv–00466–MHW, 2013 WL 6200199 (D. Idaho Nov. 27, 2013), aff’d, 595 Fed Appx. 700 (9th
Cir. 2005)
Amigos Bravos v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2011)
Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2019)
Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke
289 F. Supp. 3d 103 (D.D.C. 2018)
Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.
937 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
Center for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior
563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Center for Biological Diversity v. Jewell
No. CV–12–02296–PHX–DGC., 2014 WL 116408 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2014)
Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco
No. C–09–04087 EDL., 758 F.Supp.2d 945
Center for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Traffic Highway Safety Admin.
508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2008)
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management
No. 3:17-CV-553-LRH-WGC, 2019 WL 236727
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.
342 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Traffic Highway Safety Admin.
912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Dep’t of Interior
No. 5:14-cv-02504., 2014 WL 6944631 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2015)
Crow Indian Tribe v. United States
343 F. Supp. 3d 999 (D. Mont. 2018)
Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell
176 F. Supp. 3d 975 (D. Mont. 2016)
Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.
No. 16-CV-01993-LHK, 2016 WL 4382604 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016)
Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
321 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018), subsequent determination, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
Earth Island Inst. v. Gibson
834 F.Supp.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1010)
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23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

EarthReports, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen
665 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2011)
High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv.
52 F.Supp.3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014)
Hillsdale Env’t Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
Nos. 10–2008–CM–DJW, 10–2068–CM–DJW., 2011 WL 1102868 (D. Kan. 2011), aff’d, 702 F.3d 1156
(10th Cir. 2012)
Idaho Rivers United v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
No. C14-1800JLR, 2016 WL 498911 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2016)
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Litig.
709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Indigenous Env’t Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State
347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mont. 2018), amended and supplemented, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (D. Mont. 2018)
Kunaknana v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
23 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Alaska 2014)
League of Wilderness Defenders v. Martin
No. 2:10–CV–1346–BR, 2011 WL 2493765 (D. Or. June 23, 2011)
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton
752 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2019)
Los Padres Forestwatch v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.
Case No. CV-15-4378-MWF (JEMx), 2016 WL 5172009 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2016)
Mayo Found. v. Surface Transportation Bd.
472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006)
N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transportation Bd.
668 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011)
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
184 F. Supp. 3d 861 (D. Or. 2016)
Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell
740 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2014)
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Zinke
347 F. Supp. 3d 465 (E.D. Cal. 2018)
NRDC v. Kempthorne
506 F.Supp.2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
Nw. Env’t Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
460 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006)
Oceana Inc v. Pritzker
75 F. Supp. 3d 469 (D.D.C. 2014)
Permian Basin Petroleum Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior
MO–14–CV–50, 2015 WL 12910553 (W.D. Tex. June 24, 2015)
Protect Our Communities Found. v. Jewell
No. 13CV575 JLS (JMA)., 2014 WL 1364453 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015), aff’d, 825 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.
2016)
San Juan Citizens Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.
326 F.Supp.3d 1227 (D.N.M. 2018)
San Luis Water Auth. v. Salazar
760 F.Supp.2d 855 (E.D. Cal. 2016)
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons
871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401
(9th Cir. 1996)
Sierra Club v. Clinton
746 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Minn. 2010)
Sierra Club v. Fed. Highway Admin.
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715 F. Supp. 2d 721 (S.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d, 435 Fed. Appx. 368 (5th Cir. 2011)
49
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WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior
205 F. Supp. 3d 1176 (D. Mont. 2016)
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv.
713 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2010)
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv.
870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017)
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Appendix 2
Research Methodology
Starting with the database of 828 lawsuits initially compiled for another publication in
which we participated, 275 we made a series of revisions 276 which resulted in a final database of 222
climate-related federal lawsuits filed from 1990 to 2018 in which scientific evidence relating to
climate change is discussed. From this set of 222 cases, we collected all publicly available
documents from each lawsuit (i.e., 5,695 documents in total). We sorted the documents into one
of six author groups: plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff’s amici, defendant’s amici, court, and other. For
this Article, we only used the judicial decisions handed down in these cases.
In an attempt to select the group of lawsuits where judges engaged in discussion about
scientific uncertainty, we took a two-step approach: an automated search followed by an additional
filtering process.
Step 1: Automated Search Using NVivo
First, we conducted an automated keyword search using NVivo with words and phrases we
identified as indicative of a discussion about scientific uncertainty. These words and phrases
(which we collectively refer to as keywords) are listed in Table 2. NVivo searched these keywords
in the court opinions of the 222 lawsuits in the database.
The keyword list was constructed based on two main sources: (1) evidentiary standards
frequently used in civil cases (“legal keywords”) and (2) scales of scientific uncertainty developed
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (“scientific keywords”). We chose
these sources because both sets of terms aim to translate scientific language into lexicon used in
the legal/policy fields. In addition to the keywords from these two sources, we added a few more
keywords (also listed in Table 2) that directly describe scientific uncertainty (e.g., synonyms and
antonyms of scientific uncertainty; “main keywords”).

275
276

See McCormick et al., supra note 51.
See supra Part II (describing this culling process).
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Table 2. Codes that Indicate Discussion of Scientific Uncertainty
Main keywords
•
Scientific (+) Uncertainty
•
Scientific (+) Certainty
•
Scientific (+) Confidence
•
Scientific (+) Agreement
•
Level of uncertainty
•
Level of certainty
•
Level of confidence
•
Level of agreement
Legal keywords
Main
•
Burden of proof
•
Evidentiary standard
•
Standards of proof
Standards of Proof
•
Beyond a reasonable doubt
•
Clear and convincing evidence
•
Preponderance of the evidence
Search Warrant
•
Probable cause
Other relevant legal terms
•
Substantial evidence

Scientific keywords
IPCC Likelihood Scale
•
Virtually certain
•
Extremely likely
•
Very likely*
•
Likely*
•
More likely than not
•
About as likely as not
•
Unlikely*
•
Very unlikely*
•
Extremely unlikely
•
Exceptionally unlikely
IPCC Confidence Scale
•
Very high confidence
•
High confidence
•
Medium confidence
•
Low confidence
•
Very low confidence
*These words were searched using a slightly different approach because of a software limitation

The main keyword category is comprised of a group of synonyms and antonyms of
scientific uncertainty that are frequently mentioned in climate assessment reports from the IPCC
and U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). The IPCC assessment reports use three
main scales for describing the strength of scientific information: (1) the level of consensus of
scientific information within the scientific community (Table 3); (2) the level of confidence in
being correct about the information (Table 4); and (3) the likelihood of the future occurrence of
the predicted phenomenon (Table 5).
Table 3 shows the scale for (1) the amount of evidence available in support of scientific
findings and (2) the degree of consensus among experts on their interpretation. 277 (IPCC AR4,
2005).

Agreement

Table 3. Level of Evidence v. Degree of Agreement
High agreement
High agreement
Limited evidence
Medium evidence
Medium agreement
Medium agreement
Limited evidence
Medium evidence
Low agreement
Low agreement
Limited evidence
Medium evidence
Evidence (type, amount, quality, consistency)

High agreement
Robust evidence
Medium agreement
Robust evidence
Low agreement
Robust evidence

See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Guidance Notes for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report on Addressing Uncertainties 3 (2010), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4uncertaintyguidancenote-1.pdf.
277
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Table 4 is the level of confidence that describes the validity of scientific information as
determined through the assigned level of evidence and agreement. Confidence level increases as
the level of evidence and agreement increases, and vice versa.
Table 4. Quantitatively Calibrated Levels of Confidence
Terminology
Very high confidence
High confidence
Medium confidence
Low confidence
Very low confidence

Degree of confidence in being correct
At least 9 out of 10 chance of being correct
About 8 out of 10 chance
About 5 out of 10 chance
About 2 out of 10 chance
Less than 1 out of 10 chance

Table 5 depicts the level of likelihood, or uncertainty, defined as the probability of a
phenomenon actually occurring as predicted.
Table 5. Likelihood Scale
Terminology
Virtually certain
Very likely
Likely
About as likely as not
Unlikely
Very unlikely
Exceptionally unlikely

Likelihood of the Outcome
99-100% probability
90-100% probability
66-100% probability
33-66% probability
0-33% probability
0-10% probability
0-1% probability

The legal keywords listed in Table 2 include the terms frequently mentioned in describing
the evidentiary standards for civil cases. We selected them through a literature review (e.g., a novel
scale developed in 2003, 278 complemented with discussions with law professors who teach courses
in Civil Procedure.
To minimize the unnecessary noise in our search results, we decided to exclude some words
that are commonly used in non-scientific contexts. For example, the word “likely” may be used in
contexts other than the discussions of scientific uncertainty. The word “likely” appeared 18,642
times in the database, but many of those appearances were irrelevant to any discussions of
scientific uncertainty. For this type of keywords, we used the search wildcards embedded in the
NVivo program. 279 For example, we searched [“IPCC likely”~10], which would search for each
instance of the words “IPCC” and “likely” within ten words of each other.
Working separately on each grouping of keywords identified in Table 2 (i.e., main, legal,
and scientific) due to limitations in NVivo’s processing times, we took several steps to complete
the automated search. First, we searched for the exact keywords as listed in the table (e.g.,
See Charles Weiss, Scientific Uncertainty and Science-Based Precaution, 3 INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS: POLITICS,
LAW AND ECON. 137, 143 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024847807590,
279
According to QSR International, the developer and the distributer of NVivo software, “wildcard characters are
used in place of one or more characters when you do not know what the real character is or you do not want to type
the entire name.” NVivo, Operators and special characters, https://helpnv.qsrinternational.com/20/win/Content/queries/special-characters-operators.htm (last visited July 21, 2021).
Wildcards cannot be used as the first character of a search and they can only be used in single terms (not phrases).
An asterisk (*) may be used as a substitute for zero or more characters (for example, g*t will find get, great and gt).
A question mark (?) may be used as a substitute for a single character (for example—g?t will find get and got but
not great or grunt).
278
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“scientific uncertainty:). Second, we expanded the search by using various wildcards embedded in
the NVivo program in order to search for any relevant quotes without the exact keywords. The list
of the wildcards we used is in Table 6. Third, we integrated the automated search results from the
three groups of keywords. These steps rendered 89 court opinions that mentioned any of the
keywords in Table 2.
Table 6. Search Commands for NVivo Automated Text Search
Examples of text search commands
"level of certainty" OR "level of uncertainty" OR
"level of confidence" OR "scientific uncertainty" OR
"scientific certainty" OR "scientific confidence" OR
"scientific agreement"
Main

scien* AND certain~

Legal

"scientific uncertainty"~10, 20, 30
"scientific certainty"~10, 20, 30
"scientific confidence"~10, 20, 30
"scientific agreement"~10, 20, 30
"burden of proof" OR "evidentiary standard" OR
"beyond reasonable doubt" OR "clear and
convincing evidence" OR "preponderance of the
evidence" OR "probable cause" OR "substantial
evidence"
"virtually certain" OR "extremely likely" OR
"extremely unlikely" OR "exceptionally unlikely"
OR "high confidence" OR "medium confidence" OR
"low confidence"

Scientific

"IPCC likely"~10, 20, 30
"IPCC unlikely"~10, 20, 30
"IPCC confidence"~10, 20, 30

# of appearances
Exact text search
Documents that have both
1) words that start with scien
2) synonyms of certain in one
document
Documents that have both
1) scientific
2) uncertainty
with max 10, 20, 30 words in between
Exact text search

39

80

Exact text search
Documents that have both
1) IPCC
2) Likely/unlikely/confidence
with max 10, 20, 30 words in between

21

Total
89*
*The total number is not the total sum of the three number above. The lawsuits from each category are not mutually exclusive. Calculating the
overlaps, the total study sample, in Step 1, came to 89.

Step 2: Non-automated filtering process
After the automated keyword search, we conducted a qualitative analysis of the 89 court
opinions by reading through the paragraphs in which the keywords were embedded. This process
included three steps. First, we excluded the opinions that did not engage in any discussion of
scientific uncertainty. This step filtered out 19 cases from the 89, yielding 70 cases. This process
was essential because many of the 89 cases, even though they did have the keywords from Table
2 appear somewhere in the opinion, did not actually discuss scientific uncertainty. At this step, we
excluded cases in which courts discussed legal and procedural matters without referring to any
scientific discussion.
Conversely, certain kinds of discussion provided important signals that the courts were
addressing scientific uncertainty. We paid special attention to any discussion about thew following
subjects when determining which opinions discussed scientific uncertainty in sufficient detail to
warrant further study:
•

The scientific models and projections and whether they constituted the best available
science
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•
•
•

The research methodologies used by defendants and whether they were scientifically
supported
The credibility of a scientific study and the rationale for its use by defendants
The scientific/economic models that were unreasonably ignored by defendants

An example of the qualitative filtering process is shown below in Table 7.
Table 7. Example of Non-automated Qualitative Filtering Process
Case
Number
of Number
of
Opinions Discussion Points
Number
Paragraphs
(district/appellate/Supreme)
#14
13
3
@27 "At the outset, as Defendants point out, Plaintiffs have
failed to identify better data that the FWS should have
considered.
@20 "The best available data requirement [of the ESA]
‘merely prohibits [an agency] from disregarding available
scientific evidence that is in some way better than the
evidence [it] relies on.’ "Condensing this principle to its
essence, FWS "cannot ignore available biological
information."
@27 "Plaintiffs' failure to identify any better science or to
point any other existing data available makes this claim a
"non-starter."
@29: "Courts must defer to the Forest Service's "technical
expertise where the record demonstrates that the agency
reasonably relied on data concluding the Project meets the
standards imposed by the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA)""
#291
NA
2
This case is generally about the allowance of a settlement to
be put in place while the service fixed their BiOp (Biological
Opinion). There is no consideration on the merits of
discussion of scientific uncertainty etc.

Decision
Include

Exclude

Second, we narrowed down the sample size to cover only lawsuits focusing on the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), excluding
cases that focused on other statutory programs (such as the Clean Air Act), common law theories,
constitutional law, and state law. This reduced our database from 70 to 54 cases. As Graph 4
indicates, the NEPA cases were most frequent (30), followed by ESA cases (24), with CAA cases
numbering only seven. Although the CAA provides the federal Environmental Protection Agency
with the authority to regulated greenhouse gas emissions, 280 we decided that the seven CAA
lawsuits in which the courts that discussed scientific uncertainty were too small a number to
provide a meaningful basis for analysis.

280

See Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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Graph 4. Laws (Total 70 cases) (Red bars are NEPA and ESA)
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CAA: Clean Air Act
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act
ESA: Endangered Species Act
PTrust: Public Trust
Const: Constitution

•
•
•
•

Common: Common Law
State: State law
CWA: Clean Water Act
Other: Other laws

Thus, we focused on the statutes in which the courts addressed scientific uncertainty most
frequently: NEPA and ESA. Doing so allowed us to provide an effective qualitative analysis of
cases filed under the two statutes, to sharpen our focus on the cases with statistical power (e.g.,
adequate sample size). We wanted to focus on the environmental laws with enough of a case
sample size large enough to strengthen the external validity of our findings.
Third, of the remaining 54 cases, we decided to focus on the 51 cases with federal agencies
as defendants. The excluded three were filed against an industry group, local government, and
state government. We chose to focus on lawsuits against federal agencies because we wanted to
see if we could ascertain patterns of judicial application of a common standard of review – the
arbitrary and capricious test that applies under § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 281
which governs judicial review in NEPA cases and in relevant ESA cases. 282
In conclusion, Step 2 provided a final database of a total of 51 cases in which litigants brought
alleged agency violations of NEPA (30) or the ESA (21) in which scientific uncertainty figures
prominently in the courts’ opinions.

281
282

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2020).
See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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